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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
RANDY FETCH JEFFS, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20090737 SC 
INITIAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to § 78A-3-102(3)(h). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. As an indigent, whether Jeffs has a right to keep the counsel of his choice and 
entitlement to defense resources under the act without having to give up the private attorney 
he retained and be forced to accept LDA counsel. 
Standard of Review: Statutory interpretation by the Trial Court is reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, % 15, 4 P.3d 795. 
Citation to Record: Raised in Motions filed by defendant (R.143-145, 219-243, and 
in petition for interlocutory appeal. 
2. Whether the Utah Legislature Neither Attempted Nor Achieved Overturning 
this Court's Ruling in State v. Burns. 
Standard of Review: Statutory interpretation by the Trial Court is reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, H 15,4 P.3d 795. Appellate review of atrial court's 
determination of the law is reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,936 (Utah 
1994). 
Citation to Record: Raised for the first time on appeal. 
3. Whether Denying Indigent Defendants Defense Resources Would 
Catastrophically Undermine Pro Bono Representation By Private Attorneys in Utah 
Standard of Review: Statutory interpretation by the Trial Court is reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, H 15,4 P-3d 795. Appellate review of a trial court's 
determination of the law is reviewed for correctness. (Also, the effect of a given set of facts 
is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness.) State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 
1994). 
Citation to Record: Raised for the first time on appeal. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES 
The issues set forth above were originally raised by Jeffs in his Motion to Declare 
Defendant Indigent and to Provide an Investigator and Expert Witness at State Expense 
(R. 143+145), Supplement to Motion to Declare Defendant Indigent and to Provide an 
Investigator and Expert Witness at State Expense (R.219-243), Jeffs' Reply to State's 
Response Re Indigency (R. 181-190), the hearing before the trial court resulting in Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Declaring Defendant Indigent But Denying 
Defendant's Motion for Funds (R.280-283), and filing a Petition for Permission to Appeal 
from Interlocutory Order, subsequently granted by the Utah Supreme Court. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following determinative provisions are attached as Addendum A. 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI. 
Utah Code Ann., §77-32-101 
Utah Code Ann., §77-32-301 
Utah Code Ann., § 77-32-302 
Utah Code Ann., § 77-32-303 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-202 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 15 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, #s 1.1, 1.3, 1.16, 3.2, 6.1, and 6.2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with four 1st degree felonies pursuant to § 76-5-202, Utah 
Code Ann., "Attempted Criminal Homicide, Aggravated Murder". R. 1 -11. Defendant has 
been incarcerated since May, 2008 and has never gone to trial. R. 143-45. Defendant is 
being held on a $1,000,000 bail. (Official Trial Court docket 5-19-08 entry.) Initially, 
defendant was represented by the LDA who later withdrew when defendant desired to hire 
David Drake, an attorney used in a prior case. R.35-36, 37,51-52. At the time defendant 
hired David Drake, he had sufficient funds to do so; however, after being incarcerated for 
at least a year (presently more than two years) and his wife being unemployed, he became 
indigent and unable to pay for any defense resources such as a private investigator, medical 
expert concerning the effects of the prescription medications he was taking at the time of the 
incident, and a ballistic expert, to demonstrate that because of the path of the bullets fired by 
defendant, he had no intention to kill any police officers since he was not aiming at them 
(even though the police shot more than 40 bullets through defendant's home, all the while 
-4-
aiming at defendant who was shot twice, once through the shoulder and once through the 
right ear, that would have gone through his temple had he not fortuitously turned his head 
when the bullet struck him ). R. 143-145, 219-243. Due to the absolutely necessity of 
obtaining the aforesaid defense resources, defendant, after becoming indigent, filed a Motion 
to Declare Defendant Indigent and to Provide an Investigator and Expert Witness (R.143-
145) and a Supplement to Motion to Delcare Defendant Indigent and to Provide an 
Investigator and Expert Witness at State Expense (R.219-243). 
After receiving an opposition memorandum from the state (actually Salt Lake County) 
(R. 148-174), defendant filing his Supplement to the Indigent Motion (R.219-243), and Reply 
Memorandum from Salt Lake County (R.244-273), the Trial Court issued its Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Declaring Defendant Indigent and Denying Defense 
Resources for Defendant, and declaring Salt Lake County has no obligation to pay for any 
defense resources for defendant on August 21, 2009. R.280-283. Defendant then filed his 
Interlocutory Petition on or about September 10, 2009. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The information charged defendant (hereinafter "Jeffs") with four 1st degree 
felonies pursuant to § 76-5-202, Utah Code Ann., (identical except for the names of the 
various alleged victims): "Attempted Criminal Homicide, Aggravated Murder" and two 3rd 
degree felonies, a class A misdemeanor, and a class B misdemeanor. R.l-11. 
2. Additionally, Jeffs was also charged with two 3rd degree felonies, a class A 
misdemeanor, and a class B misdemeanor. R.l-11 
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3. Initially, Jeffs was appointed the LDA. R.35-36. LDA withdrew when Jeffs 
obtained funds to hire Morrison & Morrison and David Drake who then entered appearances 
of counsel. R.37, 51-52, 281. At the time of Jeffs' initial appearance, David Drake was out 
of state and not available. Jeffs preferred to have Mr. Drake represent him rather than the 
LDA since Mr. Drake had previously twice represented Jeffs in the West Valley City Justice 
Court, which representation included a portion of the $28,000 Jeffs stated was paid to Mr. 
Drake (R.281) (which also included $10,000 paid to Grant W. P. Morrison). 
4. Defendant has been incarcerated since May, 2008 with a $1,000,000 bond. 
R.281,143 and Official Trial Court Docket, entry of May 19,2008. Due to his incarceration, 
he has not been able to earn any income. Moreover, his wife has been unemployed since 
May, 2008, and, as of the date of this interlocutory appeal, has not obtained full time 
employment. Consequently, Jeffs is indigent and was declared so by Judge William W. 
Barrett, Third District Court Judge. R.281. 
5. Currently, defendant's home is scheduled for a foreclosure proceeding on 
September 15,2009. R.144. 
6. In the findings of the trial court, Judge Barrett found that defendant initially 
had the funds to hire private counsel but has since become indigent due to his extended 
incarceration. R.280-283. 
7. Based upon the opinion of defendant's counsel, it is necessary to hire an 
investigator to conduct interviews of the various police officers involved in order to avoid 
defendant's counsel from becoming witnesses and to perform other investigatory tasks 
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essential for his defense. R.143-145, 219-243. 
8. Moreover, due to the paths of the bullets allegedly fired by defendant and the 
fact that Jeffs has been charged with intentionally attempting to kill various police officers, 
it is essential to the defense that a ballistic expert be retained in order to assist Jeffs with his 
defense, mainly to demonstrate that Jeffs was not shooting at any police officers. R. 143-145, 
219-243. 
9. Defendant requested that medical experts be provided to testify regarding 
defendant's diminished capacity due to the side-effects of these prescription drugs, their 
interaction with each other, and the fact that Clonopin has a history of causing blackouts, 
suicide ideation, and other psychiatric problems. The prescription medications defendant 
was taking affected his capacity to understand what was occurring. It is essential for an 
expert to be provided in order to testify about defendant's diminished capacity, an expert to 
testify concerning the side-effects of the prescription drugs he was taking and the side-effects 
these drugs have with each other when taken together, and the effect such would have on the 
mental capacity of defendant. R.143-145, 219-243. 
10. Medical experts are also essential for the defense concerning Jeffs' blood work 
on the night in question, after the shootings by the West Valley City Police, when flown by 
helicopter to the hospital, and how the results of his blood work would show his condition 
and whether such affected his condition. Moreover, such experts are needed to ascertain the 
blood levels of the involved police (to show, for one, whether they were on steroids), and 
how their blood levels affected their performance and perception. R. 143-145,219-243. 
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11. Defense counsel found a psychologist/medical expert who is not on the LDA 
list who has the expertise to address these diminished capacity issues of defendant. His name 
is Dr. Ron Houston, P.O. Box 148, Providence, UT 84332, 169 N. Spring Creek Parkway, 
Suite 235, Providence, UT 84332. However, as pointed out in defendant's motion, he lacks 
the funds for this defense resource. R.301-302. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that all indigent 
defendants be provided effective assistance of counsel. See State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, 4 
P.3d 795, Tf 23. As a matter of equal protection, a state must "provide indigent prisoners with 
the basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are available for a price 
to other prisoners." Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227, 92 S.Ct. 431, 30 L.Ed.2d. 
400 (1971) and Burns, supra, at % 23. The state's argument that in order to qualify for 
defense resources, defendant must be represented by the LDA and has no choice of counsel, 
clearly is in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, since those 
defendants represented by the LDA are treated differently than those who are pro se, 
represented pro bono by members of the Utah State Bar, or who retained private counsel and 
thereafter became indigent, as is the instant case. Jeffs is entitled to have counsel of his 
choice and should not be compelled to ditch his counsel of choice in order to qualify for 
defense resources under the Indigent Defense Act. See U.S. v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 
140, 126 S.Ct. 2557 (2006) and Burns, supra, at *[j 32. As previously stated, this Court held 
in Burns, that the right to effective assistance of counsel includes the right to that assistance 
of defense resources, such as experts and private investigators, which are used by defense 
counsel as necessary tools by which to construct a defense. The Utah Indigent Defense Act 
("Act") codifies the Constitutional guarantee and provides a statutory scheme whereby 
counties can discharge their obligation to provide indigent defendants with legal counsel and 
defense resources, while having a measure of fiscal protection against the potential for 
unlimited liability when that right is asserted. Salt Lake County, in an attempt to conform 
to the Act, has entered into a contract with the Salt Lake Legal Defenders ("LDA"). 
However, contrary to the argument of Salt Lake County, its contract is insufficient to meet 
the requirements of the Act. The County also argues that receipt of such defense resources 
is conditioned upon the exclusive use of LDA attorneys. This argument is directly refuted 
by the text of the Act, is unsupported by the legislative history of the Act, and so ignores the 
holding and rationale of State v. Burns that would serve to deprive, rather protect indigent 
defendants' rights to Due Process and Equal Protection and the effective assistance of counsel 
by unreasonably constricting the resources provided, depriving such defendants the right to 
the counsel of their choice, causing a chilling effect on pro se representation, and severely 
limiting and/or impeding alternative representation by pro bono private counsel. 
ARGUMENT 
I. AS AN INDIGENT, WHETHER JEFFS HAS A RIGHT TO KEEP THE 
COUNSEL OF HIS CHOICE AND ENTITLEMENT TO DEFENSE 
RESOURCES UNDER THE ACT WITHOUT HAVING TO GIVE UP THE 
PRIVATE ATTORNEY HE RETAINED AND ACCEPT LDA COUNSEL 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that all indigent 
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defendants be provided effective assistance of counsel. See State v. Bums, 2000 UT 56, 4 
P.3d 795, Tf 23. As a matter of equal protection, a state must "provide indigent prisoners with 
the basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are available for a price 
to other prisoners." Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227, 92 S.Ct. 431, 30 L.Ed.2d. 
400 (1971) and Burns, supra, at % 23. 
It is clear that defendant would have the defense resources (expert witnesses and a 
private investigator) he requested available to him at state expense if he were represented by 
the LDA since he was found to be indigent. Since defendant is now indigent and continues 
to retain his private counsel, he is now being treated disparately. He is also being forced to 
make an election to continue to be represented by the private counsel of his choosing or fire 
that private counsel and have the LDA represent him. Part and parcel of defendant's 6th 
amendment right is the right to choice of counsel. See U.S. v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 
(2006), 126 S.Ct. 2557 ["In sum, the right at stake here is the right to counsel of choice, not 
the right to a fair trial; and that right was violated because the deprivation of counsel was 
erroneous. No additional showing of prejudice is required to make the violation 'complete.'" 
"The right to select counsel of one's choice, by contrast, has never been derived from the 
Sixth Amendment's purpose of ensuring a fair trial. It has been regarded as the root meaning 
of the constitutional guarantee."] The U.S. Supreme Court then stated: 
Deprivation of the right is "complete" when the defendant is erroneously 
prevented from being represented by the lawyer he wants, regardless of the 
quality of the representation he received. To argue otherwise is to confuse the 
right to counsel of choice — which is the right to a particular lawyer regardless 
of comparative effectiveness — with the right to effective counsel — which 
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imposes a baseline requirement of competence on whatever lawyer is chosen 
or appointed. 
Id. at 148. 
The trial court was of the opinion that in light of recent amendments to the Indigent 
Defense Act ("Act"), State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56,4 P.3d 795, was no longer controlling and 
the State did not have to provide any defense resources to Jeffs since he is being represented 
by private counsel. In light of the recent case of State v. Barber, 2009 UT App 91, filed 
April 9, 2009, it appears the Trial Court has erred. Apparently, State v. Barber reaffirmed 
the Utah Supreme Court holding in State v. Burns. The defendant in Barber hired private 
counsel but was unable to hire Dr. Rothfeder as an expert witness, which private counsel 
admitted that "an expert would have been Very' helpful in preparing the defense but that one 
was not hired because Barber lacked sufficient funds to pay an expert's fees". 
Regarding the decision in Burns, the Barber Court stated: 
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that '[u]pon 
showing that a defendant is financially unable to pay the fees of an expert 
whose services are necessary for adequate defense, the witness fee shall be 
paid as if he were called on behalf of the prosecution/ Utah R. Crim. P. 
15(a). Furthermore, Utah law guarantees indigent defendants Mpublic 
assistance for expert witnesses'' irrespective of whether they are 
represented by the LDA or private counsel. See State v. Burns, 2000 UT 
56, THJ 31-32, 4 P.3d 795 (There is no indication in [rule 15] that a defendant 
must be represented by [the] LDA to qualify for this assistance.'). [Emphasis 
added.] 
A/, at K 21. 
It is clear from Barber that 1) Burns remains good law; and 2) Utah laws guarantees 
indigent defendants public assistance for expert witnesses irrespective of whether they are 
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represented by the LDA or private counsel; consequently, defendant is entitled to the have 
the county pay for this defense resource. {Barber also noted that an element of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel is the right of a defendant who does not require appointed 
counsel to choose who will represent him. Id. at ^  41.) 
In accord, State v. Schoonmaker, 143 N.M. 373, 176 P.3d 1105 (2008) ["We note that 
most states that have interpreted their indigent defense statutes in similar cases have held that 
indigent defendants are not required to be represented by the public defender in order to 
receive state funding for ancillary services that comprise 'the basic tools of an adequate 
defense.' (Citing Burns with approval.)]; and State v. Carreno, 144 P.3d 1152, 1157-59, 
2006 UT 59 [The Utah Supreme Court noted state law "requires that a local government 
'provide [an indigent defendant with] the investigatory resources necessary for a complete 
defense.'" Utah Code Ann. §77-32-301(3) (2003). 
[RJegardless of the cost, if the resources are necessary for a complete defense, 
the court must approve them. Extending this reasoning to the Act, it would be 
inappropriate to set an absolute cap of reimbursable expenses for investigative 
purposes. Rather, a defendant should always have the opportunity to request 
approval for additional expenditures, and the court must approve such requests 
to the extent necessary for a complete defense." 
Id at 1157.] 
In accord, United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619,625 (10th Cir.1990) ["Attorneys are 
not fungible; often, the most important decision a defendant make in shaping his defense is 
his selection of an attorney"], superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized by Lewis 
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 523 F.3d 1272 (10th Cir.2008). 
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This Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel of Choice (somewhat more circumscribed 
than those of a defendant who can pay or persuade an attorney to assist him) also includes 
a separate and co-equal right to be provided with the resources necessary to preapre and 
present a complete and effective defense. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76-77, 105 
S.Ct. 1087 (1985). To assume otherwise would not only deny Jeffs his rights of Due Process, 
but his rights of Equal Protection. 
A. Whether The Denial Of These Defense Resources To Jeff Who Is Indigent 
And Not Represented By The LDA Is A Denial Of His Rights Of Due 
Process And Equal Protection 
This issue was presented to the trial court in defendant's Motion to Declare Defendant 
Indigent and to Provide An Investigator and Expert Witness [sic] at State Expense; 
defendant's Correction of Prosecutor's Statement Concerning Whether State v. Burns Is Still 
Good Law; defendant's Supplement to Motion to Declare Defendant Indigent and to Provide 
an Investigator and Expert Witnesses at State Expense; and defendant's Reply to State's 
Response Re Indigency; all contained in the Addenda. 
The consequence of the Trial Court's and Salt Lake County's interpretation of the Act, 
those indigent defendants represented by the LDA are treated differently from those indigent 
defendant represented by private counsel. Since defendant has fundamental rights 
guaranteed by state and federal constitutions where his liberty is at stake, the Act, if the Trial 
Court's and Salt Lake County's interpretations are correct, is unconstitutional. If the Trial 
Court's and Salt Lake County's interpretations are not correct, then their application of the 
Act is unconstitutional. However, both the Trial Court and Salt Lake County ignored the 
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legislative history of the Act, including its purpose, and imposed requirements in the Act that 
are no there. See argument below. 
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087 (1985), alludes to this denial of equal 
protection: "This elementary principle, grounded in significant part on the Fourteenth 
Amendment's due process guarantee of fundamental fairness, derives from the belief that 
justice cannot be equal where, simply as a result of his poverty, a defendant is denied the 
opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his liberty is at 
stake." [Emphasis added.] (However, see fn 13 expressly not applying equal protection to the 
issues in that case.) 
InBrittv. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227,92 S.Ct. 431,433, 30 L.Ed.2d400 (1971), the 
United States Supreme Court made it clear that "state[s] must, as a matter of equal protection, 
provide indigent prisoners with the basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal, when those tools 
are available for a price to other prisoners. It is equally evident that if a defendant is denied access 
to the basic tools of an adequate defense, then he has also been denied his due process right of a fair 
trial." [Emphasis added.] See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956). 
According to the United States Supreme Court, equal protection "does not require absolute 
equality or precisely equal advantages." (Ross v. Moffitt 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974) [94 S.Ct. 2437, 
41 L.Ed.2d 341].) "The duty of the State . . . is not to duplicate the legal arsenal that may be 
privately retained by a criminal defendant." However, the equal protection argument made here is 
comparing indigent defendants represented by the LDA who have a large exclusive legal arsenal 
available to them by virtue of LDA representation with indigent defendants who have retained 
private counsel and have little or no legal arsenal available to them. Such inequality should be 
-14-
rectified by treating all indigent defendants the same, providing defense resources to all indigent 
defendants regardless of legal representation. Accord, State v. Burns, supra, Tf 31. 
It should be noted that the facts here are almost identical to the facts in Burns - either 
Jeffs "(1) keep [his] attorney, retained by [him], and forgo access to state-funded expert 
assistance; or (2) give up the attorney [he] had retained and accept LDA counsel who would 
then provide [him] with access to such assistance." Id. at J^ 21. 
In order to comply with its constitutional duties, the State of Utah implemented the 
Act, § 77-32-101 et seq. At the time Jeffs filed his motions to obtain expert witnesses and 
a private investigator (defense resources) at county expense, the Act provided the following 
minimum standards for defense of an indigent: 
Each county, city, and town shall provide for the defense of an indigent in 
criminal cases in the courts and various administrative bodies of the state in 
accordance with the following minimum standards: 
(1) provide counsel for each indigent who faces the substantial probability of 
. . . the deprivation of the indigent's liberty; 
(2) afford timely representation by competent legal counsel; 
(3) provide the investigatory resources necessary for a complete defense; 
(4) assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the client; 
(5) proceed with a first appeal of right; and 
(6) prosecute other remedies before or after a conviction, considered by 
defense counsel to be in the interest of justice except for other and subsequent 
discretionary appeals or discretionary writ proceedings. 
Mat §77-32-301. 
Conspicuously absent from the requirement to provide an adequate defense is any sort 
of limitation or restraint upon the general duty imposed upon the state by this statute. In § 
302(1) of the Act, the legislature elucidates clearly the state's burden to provide both legal 
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counsel and/or "defense resources necessary for an effective defense." Subsection 302(1 )(a) 
clearly states the separate duties of providing counsel and resources; and, states with equal 
clarity, that an indigent may request "counsel or defense resources or both". [Emphasis 
added.] Thus, legal assistance and defense resources are two separate but inherent elements 
of a state's constitutional obligation to provide counsel for the indigent criminal defendant. 
In this case, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order clearly declare and 
find Jeffs indigent. Since he has been charged with four 1st degree felonies, in addition to 
other felonies and misdemeanor(s), which could result in "a substantial probability that the 
penalty to be imposed is confinement in either jail or prison" (§ 77-32-302(1)), he is 
statutorily entitled to legal counsel, defense resources, or both upon his request. See Utah 
Code Ann., § 77-32-302(l)(a). Under the plain language of the statute, Jeffs is under no 
obligation to request any of these services, nor is he required to request representation by the 
LDA if he requests only defense resources. 
In fact, § 77-32-302(1 )(b) mandates that once a defendant has been found to be 
indigent and therefor eligible for assistance, the only way the state can be relieved of its 
burden is for a defendant to "affirmatively waive or reject on the record the opportunity to 
be represented and provided defense resources [NOTE: disjunctive]." Waiving only one of 
these prongs cannot relieve the state of its duty to provide the other. Because Jeffs has not 
"affirmatively" and "on the record" waived his right to "be represented and provided defense 
resources", the state has not been relieved of its duty to provide them. 
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II. WHETHER THE UTAH LEGISLATURE NEITHER ATTEMPTED NOR 
ACHIEVED OVERTURNING THIS COURT'S RULING IN STATE V. 
BURNS1 
The issue of whether a defendant must forgo his counsel of choice in order to obtain 
expert and private investigator assistance (defense resources) was succinctly and 
authoritatively decided by this Court in State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56. In Burns, defendant's 
father provided private counsel on behalf of his daughter and the State sought to prevent her 
access to state-funded expert assistance, the same as in this case. The Burns Court held that 
where indigence and necessity are both shown, a defendant is entitled to expert witness 
funding. Id. at % 28. Burns also cited Rule 15, U.R.Crim.P., as further support for its 
holding: ''Furthermore, rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that 
"[u]pon showing that a defendant is financially unable to pay the fees of an expert whose 
services are necessary for adequate defense, the witness fee shall be paid as if he were called 
on behalf of the prosecution." Utah R.Crim. P. 15(a). (Footnotes omitted.) There is no 
indication in this rule that a defendant must be represented by LDA to qualify for this 
assistance. Instead, the only prerequisites for eligibility are financial inability to pay and 
necessity for an adequate defense." Burns, at ^ f 31. 
In its opposing memorandum to Jeffs motion for defense resources and determination 
of him being indigent, Salt Lake County argued that the Utah Legislature overturned Burns 
1
 To give credit where credit is due, this portion of the Brief is almost verbatim 
what was stated in the State v. Parduhn Brief Consequently, Jeffs is using Parduhn's 
well thought out and articulated argument since it is equally applicable to him. 
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with its post-Burns amendment and denied the applicability of State v. Barber, supra. The 
county's position overstates and misstates the effect of the post-Burns amendment to the Act. 
The changes made by the 2001 Legislature essentially add the phrase, "defense 
resources" to the clauses contained in §§ 77-32-302(1), (2)(a), and (2)(b). Looking at the 
plain language of the statute, this change was little more than a clarification that the counties 
has a duty to provide defense counsel and defense resources; and, a county can satisfy its 
duty to provide defense resources through contracting with defense experts directly or by 
allowing a legal aid association to sub-contract for defense experts and like resources. The 
additional language in § 77-32-302(1 )(a) was written in the disjunctive. An indigent may 
request "counsel OR defense resources OR both". [Emphasis added.] 
The apparent concern of the legislature was that, post-Burns, the State would have to 
pay exorbitant costs to fly in internationally-renowned experts from the four corners of the 
globe to testify on behalf of an indigent defendant when competent local authorities were 
available to satisfy the legal need. In an effort prevent this, but while recognizing the 
indigent defendant's right to have defense resources provided, the legislature attempted to 
implement a scheme to control these costs. Senator Hillyard, introducing the bill on behalf 
of bill-sponsor Senator Gladwell, elucidated this intent, as follows: 
The problem get to be, a person may have some money so he can hire 
an attorney but doesn't have the money to buy the experts he needs for trial and 
that's been the kind of problem the courts have dealt with. A recent Utah 
Supreme Court case came back and said if his money is all gone spending for 
the lawyer, then he is appointed the experts that he needs for his case and so 
these bills have been coming in and really hampering the counties. What this 
bill basically says is we acknowledge that right, but to use an expert you will 
-18-
have to take it off the panel that the court-appointed attorney uses all the time. 
They have a contract with the county, you then have these experts that they 
could use. They are good qualified experts, but here is a contract limiting what 
they can charge on fees and what the county has to pay and think it makes 
sense to give the defendant the rights he needs but still have some protection 
for the county so they don't go out and hire some expert from New York and 
bring them [sic] in and pay him whatever charges he may have. 
See Senate Floor Debate Audio Recording for Senate Bill 154 on February 12, 2001.2 
Far from attempting to overturn Burns, this Bill explicitly acknowledges Burns, not 
by name but by reference, and provides a means whereby if the counties and cities comply 
with the plain language of the statute, they would have some measure of fiscal protection 
from the seemingly unlimited obligation imposed on them by Due Process, Equal Protection, 
and §§77-32-301 and 302(1). 
A. Because Salt Lake County's Contract With LDA Has No Provision for 
Defense Resources, the Protections Included in the Act do not Apply 
Salt Lake County's claim that Jeffs must be represented by LDA in order to receive 
defense resources and/or that Jeffs must use a defense resources contracted for by the Salt 
Lake County LDA is precluded by the fact that LDA has no such contract for expert 
assistance. Section 77-32-302(2)(b) provides that a county or municipality may contract with 
a legal aid association to provide for both legal defense resources and/or counsel. Section 
77-32-302(c) also provides that the county can directly contract with defense resources and 
provide notice of such contract to a court. If the county does either of these two things, then 
the Act requires that an indigent defendant seeking appointment, first attempt to draw from 
2
 Available at 
http:/www.le.state.ut.us/asp/audio/index.asp?Sess-2001 GS&BILL=SB0154&Day=0&House=S 
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this pool of contracting or sub-contracting resources, if they are available, while preparing 
his defense. It is only in this circumstance that the provisions of § 77-32-303 of the Act 
come into play. Section 303 of the Act provides: 
If a county or municipality has contracted for, or otherwise made 
arrangements for, the legal defense of indigents, including a competent 
attorney and defense resources, the court may not appoint a noncontracting 
attorney or resource either under this part, section 78B-1 -151, or Rule 15, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, unless the court: 
(1) conducts a hearing with proper notice to the responsible entity to 
consider the authorization or designation of a noncontracting attorney or 
resource; and 
(2) makes a finding that there is a compelling reason to authorize or 
designate a noncontracting attorney or resources for the indigent defendant. 
Id. at § 77-32-303, U.C.A. 
Again, the plain language of the statute indicates that //the county has contracted 
specifically for defense resources and/or competent attorneys, only then must a defendant 
show a compelling reason to have the county pay for an expert or lawyer that is not already 
otherwise available as part of the county contract. In this case, § 303's requirement of 
showing a compelling reason does not come into play for several reasons: 1) Jeffs does not 
wish to have the court appoint, nor the county pay for, a lawyer; 2) He would happily utilize 
a private investigator, a ballistics expert, a medical expert concerning his blood samples and 
the blood samples of the West Valley City police who gave such, and a medical expert who 
would be able to testify concerning the interaction between the prescription drugs Jeffs was 
taking and how these drugs could affect his conscious decisions, memory, and suicide 
ideation; however, 3) The county has no contract with such an expert, LDA has no such 
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contract, nor does Salt Lake County have a contract with LDA to provide such. As part of 
its memorandum opposing Jeffs' request for these defense resources, Salt Lake County 
provided a copy of its contract with the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association (R. 157-174). 
This contract makes absolutely no provision for "defense resources". As a consequence, the 
County is without the protections offered in § 302 or § 303 and is therefor subject to the full 
burden imposed by Due Process and § 301 of the Act. 
B. The Existence of a Contract for Defense Resources Cannot Be Used to 
Deprive Indigent Defendants of Access to Counsel of Their Choice Or 
Defense Resources 
Assuming, arguendo, that the necessary provisions were included in the contract, the 
State would still be prevented by the plain language of the statute from asserting that the right 
to government funded defense resources was conditioned upon acceptance of LDA counsel. 
(This argument also runs afoul of the constitutional dictates of the United States Supreme 
Court cases cited above concerning an indigent's right to counsel of his choosing and to 
defense resources.) The state argues that the intent of the 2001 legislative changes to the 
statute was to force an indigent defendant to accept LDA as his legal counsel, and use LDA's 
sub-contracted board of experts for his defense resources. Yet, the State failed to cite to any 
provision in the statute or otherwise for its argument. 
Moreover, if a defendant had the temerity to relieve the County of part of its burden 
by obtaining counsel or expert advice on his own, the County's position would be that he may 
not do that, lest he forgo all other assistance necessary for his defense. Even if this strained 
reading of the statute were accurate, the fact that there is no indication, through contract or 
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otherwise, that a sub-contracted board of experts even exists prohibits the State (County) 
from denying any indigent defendant his constitutionally-guaranteed defense resources. 
Additionally, such a position would be inconsistent with the position taken by the State in 
other cases where it has taken the position that "an indigent defendant proceeding/^*? se who 
has declined standby counsel from the LDA would be able to acquire funding for expert 
assistance/' State v. Burns, supra, citing State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ^ [ 9, 35, 979 P.2d 
799. 
In reality, there is no conflict between Burns and the Act. State v. Burns merely 
articulated the two duties inherent to the right of Due Process (and Equal Protection) that 
were endorsed and codified by the legislature, which also provided a simple-to-comply-with 
scheme permitting the counties to exert some degree of reasonable control over the otherwise 
limitless potential costs of fulfilling their duties. 
While Jeffs concedes that it is reasonable for the County, through the Act, to prevent 
an indigent defendant from abusing the resources of the county by asserting exorbitant 
demands for superstar lawyers and globetrotting experts on the county's dime, it is not 
reasonable for a county to attempt to use the Act to prevent an indigent defendant from 
obtaining whatever expert or lawyer he is able to obtain through his own endeavors. The 
County's attempt to use the Act as a sword to deprive an indigent defendant of his 
constitutional rights protected by the Act, flies directly in the face of the obvious purpose of 
the Act to be a shield for those who do not have the means to otherwise prevent the 
juggernaut of the State from crushing them without pause, or care. 
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III. WHETHER DENYING INDIGENT DEFENDANTS DEFENSE RESOURCES 
WOULD CATASTROPHICALLY UNDERMINE PRO BONO 
REPRESENTATION BY PRIVATE ATTORNEYS IN UTAH 
Finally, should the county's position be adopted, the private defense bar would face 
aprofound, if not fatal, disincentive from providing pro bono or reduced fee legal services 
in Utah communities. Accepting a case without being able access the Constitutionally 
mandated defense resources to defend an indigent client would necessarily catch pro bono 
defense counsel between the Scylla and Charybdis of taking upon themselves the unlimited 
obligation discussed, supra, to fund such resources, or running afoul of, inter alia, the 
following canons of professional responsibility: 
• The requirement of reasonable thoroughness and preparation. (URPC 1.1) 
• The mandated diligence and promptness in the face of the personal burden on pro 
bono counsel in representing a client. (URPC 1.3, See comment 1.) 
• The heightened impetus to withdraw because of unreasonable financial burden, 
having a remarkable chilling effect on pro bono criminal defense representation. 
(URPC 1.16(bX6).) 
• The implicit incentive to delay litigation in order to amortize pro bono counsel's 
financial loss by delaying the case. (URPC 3.2, see comment 1.) 
• Such a scheme would provide a blanket justification for all but the richest attorneys 
to avoid appointments by the court due to the likelihood of an unreasonable financial 
burden (URPC 6.2(b). It would also almost entirely defeat the aspirational goal of 
provision of pro bono services in Rule 6.1 by any means other than the $10 per hour 
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donation. (URPC 6.1(c)). 
Moreover, such lack of availability of defense resources would produce a hotbed of 
bar complaints and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, which any reasonable attorney 
would seek to avoid. 
Furthermore, if there were an exception made to pro bono representation, such would 
constitute a denial of equal protection thereby creating another constitutional morass for the 
courts and legislature. 
CONCLUSION 
Jeffs seeks a ruling reaffirming this Court's holding in Burns, that the right to legal 
counsel and the right to defense resources are two distinct, constitutionally mandated rights 
of indigent defendants. Further, this Court should order that unless a defendant waives his 
right to both counsel and defense resources affirmatively and on the record, his waiver of one 
of these rights can not be construed as a waiver of the other. Finally, Jeffs respectfully 
requests that this Court hold that the Trial Court's denial of his motion for defense resources 
was erroneous and should be reversed, with a remand to the District Court with instructions 
to order Salt Lake County to provide Jeffs with the defense resources necessary to prepare 
his defense, as requested by him in his motions. 
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Utah Code 
Title 77 Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
Chapter 32 Indigent Defense Act 
Section 302 Assignment of counsel on request of indigent or order of court. 
77-32-302. Assignment of counsel on request of indigent or order of court. 
(1) Legal counsel shall be assigned to represent each indigent and the indigent shall also be provided 
access to defense resources necessary for an effective defense, if the indigent is under arrest for or charged 
with a crime in which there is a substantial probability that the penalty to be imposed is confinement in 
either jail or prison if: 
(a) the indigent requests counsel or defense resources, or both; or 
(b) the court on its own motion or otherwise orders counsel, defense resources, or both and the defendant 
does not affirmatively waive or reject on the record the opportunity to be represented and provided defense 
resources. 
(2) (a) If a county responsible for providing indigent legal defense, including counsel and defense 
resources, has established a county legal defender's office and the court has received notice of the 
establishment of the office, the court shall assign to the county legal defender's office the responsibility to 
defend indigent defendants within the county and provide defense resources. 
(b) If the county or municipality responsible to provide for the legal defense of an indigent, including 
defense resources and counsel, has arranged by contract to provide those services through a legal aid 
association, and the court has received notice or a copy of the contract, the court shall assign the legal aid 
association named in the contract to defend the indigent and provide defense resources. 
(c) If the county or municipality responsible for providing indigent legal defense, including counsel and 
defense resources, has contracted to provide those services through individual attorneys, individual defense 
resources, or associations providing defense resources, and the court has received notice or a copy of the 
contracts, the court shall assign a contracting attorney as the legal counsel to represent an indigent and a 
contracted defense resource to provide defense-related services. 
(d) If no county legal defender's office exists, the court shall select and assign an attorney or defense 
resource if: 
(i) the contract for indigent legal services is with multiple attorneys or resources; or 
(ii) the contract is with another attorney in the event of a conflict of interest. 
(e) If the court considers the assignment of a noncontracting attorney or defense resource to provide legal 
services to an indigent defendant despite the existence of an indigent legal services contract and the court 
has a copy or notice of the contract, before the court may make the assignment, it shall: 
(i) set the matter for a hearing; 
(ii) give proper notice of the hearing to the attorney of the responsible county or municipality; and 
(iii) make findings that there is a compelling reason to appoint a noncontracting attorney or defense 
resource. 
(f) The indigent's preference for other counsel or defense resources may not be considered a compelling 
reason justifying the appointment of a noncontracting attorney or defense resource. 
(3) The court may make a determination of indigency at any time. 
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Title 77 Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
Chapter 32 Indigent Defense Act 
Section 303 Standard for court to appoint noncontracting attorney or defense resource -- Hearing. 
77-32-303* Standard for court to appoint noncontracting attorney or defense resource -- Hearing, 
If a county or municipality has contracted for, or otherwise made arrangements for, the legal defense of 
indigents, including a competent attorney and defense resources, the court may not appoint a noncontracting 
attorney or resource either under this part, Section 78B-1-151, or Rule 15, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, unless the court: 
(1) conducts a hearing with proper notice to the responsible entity to consider the authorization or 
designation of a noncontract attorney or resource; and 
(2) makes a finding that there is a compelling reason to authorize or designate a noncontracting attorney 
or resources for the indigent defendant. 
Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
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Rule 1.1 8/20/10 11:38 AM 
Rule 1.1. Competence. 
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. 
Comment 
Legal Knowledge and Skill 
[1] In determining whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter, relevant factors include the 
relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer's general experience, the lawyer's training and experience in 
the field in question, the preparation and study the lawyer is able to give the matter and whether it is feasible to refer the matter 
to, or associate or consult with, a lawyer of established competence in the field in question. In many instances, the required 
proficiency is that of a general practitioner. Expertise in a particular field of law may be required in some circumstances. 
[2] A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle legal problems of a type with which the 
lawyer is unfamiliar. A newly admitted lawyer can be as competent as a practitioner with long experience. Some important legal 
skills, such as the analysis of precedent, the evaluation of evidence and legal drafting, are required in all legal problems. Perhaps 
the most fundamental legal skill consists of determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill that 
necessarily transcends any particular specialized knowledge. A lawyer can provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field 
through necessary study. Competent representation can also be provided through the association of a lawyer of established 
competence in the field in question. 
[3] In an emergency a lawyer may give advice or assistance in a matter in which the lawyer does not have the skill ordinarily 
required where referral to or consultation or association with another lawyer would be impractical. Even in an emergency, 
however, assistance should be limited to that reasonably necessary in the circumstances, for ill-considered action under 
emergency conditions can jeopardize the client's interest. 
[4] A lawyer may accept representation where the requisite level of competence can be achieved by reasonable preparation. This 
applies as well to a lawyer who is appointed as counsel for an unrepresented person. See also Rule 6.2. 
Thoroughness and Preparation 
[5] Competent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem 
and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners. It also includes adequate preparation. The 
required attention and preparation are determined in part by what is at stake; major litigation and complex transactions ordinarily 
require more extensive treatment than matters of lesser complexity and consequence. An agreement between the lawyer and the 
client regarding the scope of the representation may limit the matters for which the lawyer is responsible. See Rule 1.2(c). 
Maintaining Competence 
[6] To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, engage in 
continuing study and education and comply with all continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is subject. 
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ule 1.16. Declining or terminating representation. 
0 Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall 
ithdraw from the representation of a client if: 
3)(1) the representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law; 
3)(2) the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's ability to represent the client; or 
a)(3) the lawyer is discharged. 
b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if: 
b ) ( l ) withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client ; 
b)(2) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or 
raudulent; 
b)(3) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud; 
b)(4) the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental 
lisagreement; 
b)(5) the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer's services and has been given 
easonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled; 
b)(6) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult 
)y the client; or 
^b)(7) other good cause for withdrawal exists. 
[c) A lawyer must comply with applicable law requiring notice to or permission of a tribunal when terminating a representation. 
When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the 
-epresentation. 
(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's 
interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or 
incurred. The lawyer must provide, upon request, the client's file to the client. The lawyer may reproduce and retain copies of the 
client file at the lawyer's expense. 
Comment 
1. A lawyer should not accept representation in a matter unless it can be performed competently, promptly, without improper 
conflict of interest and to completion. Ordinarily, a representation in a matter is completed when the agreed upon assistance has 
been concluded. See Rules 1.2(c) and 6.5. See also Rule 1.3, Comment 4. 
Mandatory Withdrawal 
2. A lawyer ordinarily must decline or withdraw from representation if the client demands that the lawyer engage in conduct that 
is illegal or violates the rules of professional conduct or other law. The lawyer is not obliged to decline or withdraw simply 
because the client suggests such a course of conduct; a client may make such a suggestion in the hope that a lawyer will not be 
constrained by a professional obligation. 
3. When a lawyer has been appointed to represent a client, withdrawal ordinarily requires approval of the appointing authority. 
See also Rule 6.2. Similarly, court approval or notice to the court is often required by applicable law before a lawyer withdraws 
from pending litigation. Difficulty may be encountered if withdrawal is based on the client's demand that the lawyer engage in 
unprofessional conduct. The court may request an explanation for the withdrawal, while the lawyer may be bound to keep 
confidential the facts that would constitute such an explanation. The lawyer's statement that professional considerations require 
termination of the representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient. Lawyers should be mindful of their obligations to 
both clients and the court under Rules 1.6 and 3.3. 
Discharge 
4. A client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for payment for the lawyer's 
services. Where future dispute about the withdrawal may be anticipated, it may be advisable to prepare a written statement 
reciting the circumstances. 
5. Whether a client can discharge appointed counsel may depend on applicable law. A client seeking to do so should be given a 
full explanation of the consequences. These consequences may include a decision by the appointing authority that appointment of 
successor counsel is unjustified, thus requiring self representation by the client. 
6. If the client has severely diminished capacity, the client may lack the legal capacity to discharge the lawyer, and in any event 
>://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/ucja/ch 13/ l_16.htm Page 1 of 2 
Rule 1 8/20/10 11 39 AM 
the discharge may be seriously adverse to the client's interests. The lawyer should make special effort to help the client consider 
the consequences and may take reasonably necessary protective action as provided in Rule 1.14. 
Optional Withdrawal 
7. A lawyer may withdraw from representation in some circumstances. The lawyer has the option to withdraw if it can be 
accomplished without material adverse effect on the client's interests. Withdrawal is also justified if the client persists in a course 
of action that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent, for a lawyer is not required to be associated with such 
conduct even if the lawyer does not further it. Withdrawal is also permitted if the lawyer's services were misused in the past even 
if that would materially prejudice the client. The lawyer may also withdraw where the client insists on taking action that the 
lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement. 
8. A lawyer may withdraw if the client refuses to abide by the terms of an agreement relating to the representation, such as an 
agreement concerning fees or court costs or an agreement limiting the objectives of the representation. 
Assisting the Client upon Withdrawal 
9. Even if the lawyer has been unfairly discharged by the client, a lawyer must take all reasonable steps to mitigate the 
consequences to the client. See Rule 1.15. Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall provide, upon request, the client's 
file to the client notwithstanding any other law, including attorney lien laws. It is impossible to set forth one all encompassing 
definition of what constitutes the client file. However, the client file generally would include the following: all papers and property 
the client provides to the lawyer; litigation materials such as pleadings, motions, discovery, and legal memoranda; all 
correspondence; depositions; expert opinions; business records; exhibits or potential evidence; and witness statements. The client 
file generally would not include the following: the lawyer's work product such as recorded mental impressions; research notes; 
legal theories; internal memoranda; and unfiled pleadings. The Utah rule differs from the ABA Model Rule in requiring that papers 
and property considered to be part of the client's file be returned to the client notwithstanding any other laws or fees or expenses 
owing to the lawyer. 
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ule 1.3. Diligence. 
lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. 
omment 
L] A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer 
rid take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer must act with 
Dmmitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf. A lawyer is not bound, 
owever, to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client. For example, a lawyer may have authority to exercise 
rofessional discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be pursued. See Rule 1.2. The lawyer's duty to act 
1th reasonable diligence does not require the use of offensive tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in the legal 
rocess with courtesy and respect. 
2] A lawyer's work load must be controlled so that each matter can be handled competently. 
3] Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than procrastination. A client's interests often can be adversely 
ffected by the passage of time or the change of conditions; in extreme instances, as when a lawyer overlooks a statute of 
mitations, the client's legal position may be destroyed. Even when the client's interests are not affected in substance, however, 
nreasonabie delay can cause a client needless anxiety and undermine confidence in the lawyer's trustworthiness. A lawyer's duty 
D act with reasonable promptness, however, does not preclude the lawyer from agreeing to a reasonable request for a 
ostponement that will not prejudice the lawyer's client. 
4] Unless the relationship is terminated as provided in Rulel.16, a lawyer should carry through to conclusion all matters 
ndertaken for a client. If a lawyer's employment is limited to a specific matter, the relationship terminates when the matter has 
>een resolved. If a lawyer has served a client over a substantial period in a variety of matters, the client sometimes may assume 
hat the lawyer will continue to serve on a continuing basis unless the lawyer gives notice of withdrawal. Doubt about whether a 
lient-lawyer relationship still exists should be clarified by the lawyer, preferably in writing, so that the client will not mistakenly 
uppose the lawyer is looking after the client's affairs when the lawyer has ceased to do so. For example, if a lawyer has handled 
i judicial or administrative proceeding that produced a result adverse to the client and the lawyer and the client have not agreed 
hat the lawyer will handle the matter on appeal, the lawyer must consult with the client about the possibility of appeal before 
elinquishing responsibility for the matter. See Rule 1.4(a)(2). Whether the lawyer is obligated to prosecute the appeal for the 
:lient depends on the scope of the representation the lawyer has agreed to provide to the client. See Rule 1.2. 
5] To prevent neglect of client matters in the event of a sole practitioner's death or disability, the duty of diligence may require 
hat each sole practitioner prepare a plan, in conformity with applicable rules, that designates another competent lawyer to review 
:lient files, notify each client of the lawyer's death or disability, and determine whether there is a need for immediate protective 
iction. Cf. Rule 27 of the Utah Rules for Lawyer Discipline and Disability (providing for court appointment of a lawyer to inventory 
iles and take other protective action in absence of a plan providing for another lawyer to protect the interests of the clients of a 
ieceased or disabled lawyer). 
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Rule 3.2. Expediting Litigation. 
A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client. 
Comment 
[1] Dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Although there will be occasions when a lawyer may 
properly seek a postponement for personal reasons, it is not proper for a lawyer to routinely fail to expedite litigation solely for 
the convenience of the advocates. Nor will a failure to expedite be reasonable if done for the purpose of frustrating an opposing 
party's attempt to obtain rightful redress or repose. The standard is whether a competent lawyer acting in good faith would 
regard the course of action as having some substantial purpose other than delay. Realizing financial or other benefit from 
otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest of the client. 
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ule 6 .1 . Voluntary Pro Bono Legal Service. 
very lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay. A lawyer should aspire to render at 
>ast 50 hours of pro bono publico legal services per year. In fulfilling this responsibility, the lawyer should: 
a) provide a substantial majority of the 50 hours of legal services without fee or expectation of fee to: 
a ) ( l ) persons of limited means or 
a)(2) charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational organizations in matters that are designed primarily 
:o address the needs of persons of limited means; and 
;b) provide any additional services through: . 
(b)(1) delivery of legal services at no fee or substantially reduced fee to individuals, groups or organizations seeking to secure or 
protect civil rights, civil liberties or public rights, or charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational 
organizations in matters in furtherance of their organizational purposes, where the payment of standard legal fees would 
significantly deplete the organization's economic resources or would be otherwise inappropriate; 
(b)(2) delivery of legal services at a substantially reduced fee to persons of limited means; or 
(b)(3) participation in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the legal profession. 
(c) A lawyer may also discharge the responsibility to provide pro bono publico legal services by making an annual contribution of 
at least $10 per hour for each hour not provided under paragraph (a) or (b) above to an agency that provides direct services as 
defined in paragraph (a) above. 
(d) Each lawyer is urged to report annually to the Utah State Bar whether the lawyer has satisfied the lawyer's professional 
responsibility to provide pro bono legal services. Each lawyer may report this information through a simplified reporting form that 
is made a part of the Bar's annual dues statement. 
(e) In addition to providing pro bono legal services , a lawyer should voluntarily contribute financial support to organizations that 
provide legal services to persons of limited means. 
Comment 
[1] Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional work load, has a responsibility to provide legal services to 
those unable to pay. Personal involvement in the problems of the disadvantaged can be one of the most rewarding experiences in 
the life of a lawyer. All lawyers are urged to provide a minimum of 50 hours of pro bono services annually. It is recognized that 
in some years a lawyer may render greater or fewer hours than the annual standard specified, but during the course of the 
lawyer's legal career, each lawyer should render on average per year, the number of hours set forth in this Rule. Services can be 
performed in civil, criminal or quasi-criminal matters for which there is no government obligation to provide funds for legal 
representation, such as post-conviction death penalty appeal cases. 
[2] Paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) recognize the critical need for legal services that exists among persons of limited means by 
providing that a substantial majority of the legal services rendered annually to the disadvantaged be furnished without fee or 
expectation of fee. Legal services under these paragraphs consist of a full range of activities, including individual and class 
representation, the provision of legal advice, legislative lobbying, administrative rule making and the provision of free training or 
mentoring to those who represent persons of limited means. The variety of these activities should facilitate participation by 
government lawyers, corporate counsel and others, even when restrictions exist on their engaging in the outside practice of law. 
[3] Persons eligible for legal services under paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) are those who qualify for participation in programs 
funded by the Legal Services Corporation and those whose incomes and financial resources are slightly above the guidelines 
utilized by such programs but nevertheless cannot afford counsel. Legal services can be rendered to individuals or to 
organizations such as homeless shelters, battered women's centers and food pantries that serve those of limited means. The term 
"governmental organizations" includes, but is not limited to, public protection programs and sections of governmental or public 
sector agencies. 
[4] Because service must be provided without fee or expectation of fee, the intent of the lawyer to render free legal services is 
essential for the work performed to fall within the meaning of paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2). Accordingly, services rendered cannot 
be considered pro bono if an anticipated fee is uncollected, but the award of statutory attorneys' fees in a case originally accepted 
as pro bono would not disqualify such services from inclusion under this section. Lawyers who do receive fees in such cases are 
encouraged to contribute an appropriate portion of such fees to organizations or projects that benefit persons of limited means. 
[5] While it is possible for a lawyer to fulfill the annual responsibility to perform pro bono services exclusively through activities 
described in paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2), to the extent that any hours of service remain unfulfilled, the remaining commitment 
can be met in a variety of ways as set forth in paragraph (b). Constitutional, statutory or regulatory restrictions may prohibit or 
impede government and public sector lawyers and judges from performing the pro bono services outlined in paragraphs (a)(1) and 
(a)(2). Accordingly, where those restrictions apply, government and public sector lawyers and judges may fulfill their pro bono 
responsibility by performing services outlined in paragraph (b). 
[6] Paragraph (b)(1) includes the provision of certain types of legal services to those whose incomes and financial resources place 
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them above limited means. It also permits the pro bono lawyer to accept a substantially reduced fee for services. Examples of 
the types of issues that may be addressed under this paragraph include First Amendment claims, Title VII claims and 
environmental protection claims. Additionally, a wide range of organizations may be represented, including social service, medical 
research, cultural and religious groups. 
[7] Paragraph (b)(2) covers instances in which lawyers agree to and receive a modest fee for furnishing pro bono legal services 
to persons of limited means. Participation in judicare programs and acceptance of court appointments in which the fee is 
substantially below a lawyer's usual rate are encouraged under this section. 
[8] Paragraph (b)(3) recognizes the value of lawyers engaging in activities that improve the law, the legal system or the legal 
profession. Serving on bar association committees, serving on boards of pro bono or legal services programs, taking part in Law 
Day and other law related education activities, acting as a continuing legal education instructor, a mediator or an arbitrator and 
engaging in legislative lobbying to improve the law, the legal system or the profession are a few examples of the many activities 
that fall within this paragraph. 
[9] Because the provision of pro bono services is a professional responsibility, it is the individual ethical commitment of each 
lawyer. Nevertheless, there may be times when it is not feasible for a lawyer to engage in pro bono services. At such times a 
lawyer may discharge the pro bono responsibility by providing financial support to organizations providing free legal services to 
persons of limited means. In addition, at times it may be more feasible to satisfy the pro bono responsibility collectively, as by a 
firm's aggregate pro bono activities. 
[9a] The Utah Rule, unlike the Model ABA Rule, contains paragraph (c), which explicitly allows lawyers to discharge their pro bono 
services responsibility by annually contributing at least $10 per hour for each hour not provided under paragraphs (a) and (b). 
While the personal involvement of each lawyer in the provision of pro bono legal services is generally preferable, such personal 
involvement may not always be possible. The annual contribution alternative allows a lawyer to provide financial assistance to 
increase and improve the delivery of pro bono legal services when a lawyer cannot or decides not to provide pro bono legal 
services through the contribution of time. Also, there is no prohibition against a lawyer's contributing a combination of hours and 
financial support. 
[10] Because the efforts of individual lawyers are not enough to meet the need for free legal services that exists among persons 
of limited means, the government and the profession have instituted additional programs to provide those services. Every lawyer 
should financially support such programs, in addition to either providing direct pro bono services or making financial contributions 
when pro bono service is not feasible. 
[11] Law firms should act reasonably to enable and encourage all lawyers in the firm to provide the pro bono legal services called 
for in this Rule. 
[11a] The Utah Rule, unlike the Model ABA Rule, contains paragraph (d) concerning voluntary reporting to the Utah State Bar. 
Voluntary reporting is designed to provide a basis for reminding lawyers of their professional responsibility under this Rule and to 
provide useful statistical information. The intent of this Rule is to direct resources towards providing representation for persons of 
limited means. Therefore, only contributions made to organizations described in subsection (a) should be reported. Reporting 
records for individual attorneys will not be kept or released by the Utah State Bar. The Utah State Bar will gather useful statistical 
information at the close of each reporting cycle and then purge individual reporting statistics from its database. The general 
statistical information will be maintained by the Bar for year-to-year comparisons and may be released, at the Bar's discretion, to 
appropriate organizations and individuals for furthering access to justice in Utah. 
[12] The responsibility set forth in this Rule is not intended to be enforced through disciplinary process. 
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lule 6.2. Accepting Appointments. 
\ lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a person except for good cause, such as. 
a) Representing the client is likely to result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law; 
b) Representing the client is likely to result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer; or 
]c) The client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer's 
ability to represent the client. 
Comment 
[1] A lawyer ordinarily is not obliged to accept a client whose character or cause the lawyer regards as repugnant. The lawyer's 
freedom to select clients is, however, qualified. All lawyers have a responsibility to assist in providing pro bono publico service. 
See Rule 6.1 An individual lawyer fulfills this responsibility by accepting a fair share of unpopular matters or indigent or 
unpopular clients. A lawyer may also be subject to appointment by a court to serve unpopular clients or persons unable to afford 
legal services. 
Appointed Counsel 
[2] For good cause a lawyer may seek to decline an appointment to represent a person who cannot afford to retain counsel or 
whose cause is unpopular. Good cause exists if the lawyer could not handle the matter competently, see Rule 1.1, or if 
undertaking the representation would result in an improper conflict of interest, for example, when the client or the cause is so 
repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent the client. A 
lawyer may also seek to decline an appointment if acceptance would be unreasonably burdensome, for example, when it would 
impose a financial sacrifice so great as to be unjust. 
[3] An appointed lawyer has the same obligations to the client as retained counsel, including the obligations of loyalty and 
confidentiality, and is subject to the same limitations on the client-lawyer relationship, such as the obligation to refrain from 
assisting the client in violation of the Rules. 
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lule 15. Expert witnesses and interpreters. 
a) The court may appoint any expert witness agreed upon by the parties or of its own selection. An expert so appointed shall be 
nformed of his duties by the court in writing, a copy of which shall be filed. An expert so appointed shall advise the court and 
he parties of his findings and may thereafter be called to testify by the court or by any party. He shall be subject to cross-
examination by each party. The court shall determine the reasonable compensation of the expert and direct payment thereof. The 
parties may call expert witnesses of their own at their own expense. Upon showing that a defendant is financially unable to pay 
:he fees of an expert whose services are necessary for adequate defense, the witness fee shall be paid as if he were called on 
3ehalf of the prosecution. 
[b) The court may appoint an interpreter of its own selection and shall determine reasonable compensation and direct payment 
:hereof. The court may allow counsel to question the interpreter before he is sworn to discharge the duties of an interpreter. 
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DAVID DRAKE, P.C. 
6905 South 1300 East, #248 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 205-9049 
Co-Counsel, for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 





MOTION TO DECLARE 
DEFENDANT INDIGENT AND TO 
PROVIDE AN INVESTIGATOR 
AND EXPERT WITNESS AT 
STATE EXPENSE 
Case No. 081903791 
Judge Barrett 
COMES NOW defendant, through counsel, and moves this Court for an order declaring him 
indigent and to provide defendant with an investigator and expert witnesses at state expense. This 
motion is based upon the following: 
1. Defendant has been incarcerated in the Salt Lake County Adult Correctional Facility 
since May, 2008. At the time of his incarceration, he lost his full-time employment and has earned 
no income since his incarceration. As of the date of this motion, he has been incarcerated 
approximately nine months. 
2. Partially due to the order prohibiting any contact between defendant and his wife 
prohibiting them from working together to find a solution to their tremendous financial difficulties, 
defendant's home has gone into foreclosure and defendant and his wife are bound to lose everything. 
Moreover, defendant's financial problems have been exacerbated by the feet that defendant's wife 
has been unemployed most of the time he has been incarcerated. 
3. Based upon the opinion of defendant's counsel, it is necessary to hire an investigator 
to conduct interviews of the various police officers involved in order to avoid defendant's counsel 
from becoming witnesses and to perform other investigatory tasks essential for his defense. 
4. Moreover, due to the paths of the bullets allegedly fired by defendant and the fact that 
defendant has been charged with intentionally attempting to kill various police officers, it is essential 
to the defense of defendant that a ballistic expert be retained in order to assist defendant with his 
defense. 
5. Prior to the episode leading to his arrest, defendant inadvertently ingested various 
quantities of prescription drugs and alcohol, which, in the opinion of defendant substantially altered 
his mental state to the point that he has no recollection of the events leading to his arrest. 
Consequently, it is part of his defense that an medical expert be retained concerning the effects of 
such prescription medications - their interaction with each other and the quantity taken - along with 
their interaction with alcohol - in order to assist defendant with his defense. 
Due to defendant's indigent status, he is unable to pay for these experts and investigator on 
his own. These experts and investigator are critical to his defense. Therefore, it is respectfully 
requested that these experts and investigator be appointed for and in behalf of defendant 
_?_ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of February, 2009. 
DAVID DRAKE, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendant 
David Drake 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
L the undersigned, hereby certify that on February 9, 2009 a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing motion to declare defendant indigent and to provide experts and investigator for defendant 
was served via hand-delivery on the following counsel of record: 
Michaela AndruzzL Esq. 
Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(Fax: 801/366-7828) 
And the Original filed via LMI with: 
Judge William W. Barrett 
Third District Court 
Salt Lake Department 
450 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
By: lUvU /U^U 
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DAVID DRAKE, USB #0911 
DAVID DRAKE, P.C. 
6905 South 1300 East, #248 
Mid vale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 205-9049 
Co-Counsel for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, ) SUPPLEMENT TO MOTION 
) TO DECLARE DEFENDANT 
Plaintiff, ) INDIGENT AND TO PROVIDE AN 
) INVESTIGATOR AND EXPERT 
vs. ) WITNESSES AT STATE EXPENSE 
) 
RANDY JEFFS, ) Case No. 081903791 
) 
Defendant. ) Judge Barrett 
) 
COMES NOW defendant, through counsel, and pursuant to Court order files this supplement 
to defendant's motion to declare defendant indigent and to provide an investigator and expert witness 
at state expense. The trial court has indicated that it may be persuaded by the state's argument 
concerning the application of the Indigent Defense Act, querying whether State v. Burns, 2000 UT 
56, 4 P.3d 795 is still good law. Bums has been upheld by the Utah Court of Appeals as recently 
as April, 2009 in State v. Barber, 2009 UT App 91, a copy of which is appended to this supplement. 
Consequently, the state's arguments to the contrary, defendant's indigency motion should be granted 
and that an investigator and expert witnesses be provided to him at state expense,. 
This supplement incorporates hereat defendant's original motion to declare him indigent and 
to provide an investigator and expert witness at state expense. The original motion is supplemented 
as follows: 
1. The providing of an investigator is absolutely essential to defendant's defense. First, 
defendant opted to defer the preliminary hearing in order to directly interview the police witnesses. 
The state agreed to this. However, defendant's attorney cannot interview these witnesses, since to 
do so, would violate his ethical duties not to place himself in a position where he could be called as 
a witness. For example, in the event the state's police witnesses stated something at trial that differed 
from what they stated to counsel during the interview., counsel would likely be called as a witness 
to impeach the statement. 'That would disqualify defense counsel to act as an attorney for defendant. 
2. Second, neighbors have to be investigated as to what they witnessed. Again, as in 
the above-example, if defense counsel conducted the interviews, he would be potential witness. It 
is essential to the defense to have these neighbors interviewed since several of them were eye-
witnesses. One neighbor had to have a bullet extracted from her car. It is necessary to interview 
that witness to ascertain where the bullet came from and what happened to it after the extraction. 
3. Third, medical personnel who initially saw and treated defendant must be 
investigated. This includes paramedics, helicopter crew members, officers attending defendant's 
wounds, healthcare providers at the hospital where.defendant was taken, and those who worked in 
the lab. at the hospital The information that could be culled from this investigation is critical to the 
defense. Again, defense counsel cannot do it because of the potential of becoming a witness. 
4. Fourth, a ballistics expert witness should be provided. Defendant has been charged 
with several first degree felonies based upon his shooting at police officers. Lack of intends, critical 
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to the defense. A ballistic expert is required to assist in establishing this. There are issues of 
stippling, the angle of the bullets fired from defendant's pistol, information concerning the bullet 
taken from the neighbor's car. and other very material essential and relevant facts concerning the 
shooting. Of course, as the investigation progresses, the need for such an expert will increase. 
5. Fifth, medical experts should be provided. The actions of defendant on the day in 
question are an anomaly. The prescription medications defendant was taking affected his capacity 
to understand what was occurring. It is essential for an expert to be provided in order to testify about 
defendant's diminished capacity, an expert to testify concerning the side-effects of the prescription 
drugs he was taking and the side-effects these drugs have with each other when taken together, and 
the effect such would have on. the mental capacity of defendant. Medical experts are also essential 
for the defense concerning defendant's blood work on the night in question and how the results of 
his blood work would affect, his condition. Moreover, such experts are needed to ascertain the blood 
levels of the involved police and how this affected their performance and perception. See Ake v. 
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985)105 S.Ct. 1087 [state to provide psychiatrist]. 
It is submitted that if that portion of the Indigent Defense Act ("Act") that applies to the 
providing of defense resources is only applied to defendants represented by the LDA as suggested 
by the state, and not to other indigent defendants, especially those who become indigent after their 
arrest and incarceration, such a strictured view violates defendant's rights of due process since he is 
not treated as other indigent defendants. Moreover such a narrow view would have the effect of 
forcing defendant to choose between the counsel he originally hired prior to becoming indigent or 
firing that attorney to have an LDA appointed so he could benefit from the Act and have defense 
resources provided him. This clearly violates defendant's 6th amendment rights to have the effective 
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assistance of counsel (as well as Rule 15, U.R.Crim.P.). Part and parcel of this 6th amendment right 
is the right to choice of counsel. See U.S. v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006), 126 S.Ct. 2557 
["In sum, the right at stake here is the right to counsel of choice, not the right to a fair trial; and that 
right was violated because the deprivation of counsel was erroneous. No additional showing of 
prejudice is required to make the violation 'complete."' "The right to select counsel of one's choice, 
by contrast, has never been derived from the Sixth Amendment's purpose of ensuring a fair trial. It 
has been regarded as the root meaning of the constitutional guarantee."] The U.S. Supreme Court 
then stated: 
Deprivation of the right is "complete" when the defendant is erroneously prevented 
from being represented by the lawyer he wants, regardless of the quality of the 
representation he received. To argue otherwise is to confuse the right to counsel of 
choice — which is the right to a particular lawyer regardless of comparative 
effectiveness — with the right to effective counsel — which imposes a baseline 
requirement of competence on whatever lawyer is chosen or appointed. 
M a t 148. 
The fact is that defendant is indigent. He is indigent under the guidelines of the Act. He 
cannot afford the defense resources essential to his defense because he is now indigent. On the other 
hand, were he represented by the LDA, he would have all of the Act's defense resources available 
to him. According to the argument of the state, he must fire his attorney of choice in order to qualify 
for these defense resources. Not only is that a violation of his rights of equal protection (those 
indigent defendants represented by the LDA are treated differently than he because he initially had 
the money to hire a private attorney but, due to his incarceration, he is now indigent and not able to 
afford the defense resources he would have if represented by the LDA), it is also in violation of 
defendant's 6th amendment right to counsel which necessarily includes the right to have counsel of 
his choosing. He should not be forced to choose between, his 6lh amendment right and to have the 
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resources for an effective defense. 
This Court manifested an opinion that due to the amendments in the Act since State v. Burns, 
2000 UT 56, 4 Pod 795, State v. Burns is no longer controlling. That is not the case. State v. 
Barber, 2009 UT App 91, filed April 9, 2009, reaffirmed the holding in State v. Barber. The 
defendant in Barber hired private counsel but was unable to hire Dr. Rothfeder as an expert witness, 
which private counsel admitted that "an expert would have been 'very' helpful in preparing the 
defense but that one was not hired because Barber lacked sufficient funds to pay an expert's tees". 
Regarding the decision in Burns, the Barber Court stated: 
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that '[u]pon showing that 
a defendant is financially unable to pay the fees of an expert whose services are 
necessary for adequate defense, the witness fee shall be paid as if he were called 
on behalf of the prosecution/ Utah R. Crim. P. 15(a). Furthermore, Utah law 
guarantees indigent defendants "public assistance for expert witnesses" 
irrespective of whether they are represented by the LDA or private counsel See 
State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, «ffl 31-32,4 P.3d 795 ("There is no indication in [rule 15] 
that a defendant must be represented by [the] LDA. to qualify for this assistance.'). 
[Emphasis added.] 
M a t €,( 21. 
It is clear from Barber that 1) Burns remains good law; and 2) Utah laws guarantees indigent 
defendants public assistance for expert witnesses irrespective of whether they are represented by the 
LDA or private counsel; consequently, defendant is entitled to the have the county pay for this 
defense resource. 
Inaccord, Schmidt v. Uhlenhopp,258lQwa77L 14GN,W.2d 118 (1966) (dissenting opinion) 
["It would be strange if the Constitution required the government to furnish both counsel and 
investigative services in cases where the indigent needs and requests public payment for only 
investigative services. The State's theory would impose an unreasonable and unnecessary additional 
-> 
burden on the public treasury." (Citing Bums with approval]; and State v. Schoonmaker, 143 N.M. 
373, 176 P.3d 1105 (2008) ["We note that most states that have interpreted their indigent defense 
statutes in similar cases have held that indigent defendants are not required to be represented by the 
public defender in order to receive state funding for ancillary services that comprise 'the basic tools 
of an adequate defense.' (Citing Bums with approval.)] 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Burns is still good law and should be applied to this case. 
Moreover, Rule 15, U.R.Crim.P.. mandates that the county pay defendant's costs for his defense 
resources. Barber reaffirmed Burns. Defendant is indigent. As such, he is entitled to have the 
county pay for his defense resources. Consequently, his motion for such should be granted. 
DATED June 15, 2009. 
DAVID DRAKE, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendant 
David Drake 
-6-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I. the undersigned, hereby certify that on June 15, 2009 a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing supplement to delendant's motion to declare defendant indigent and to provide experts and 
investigator for defendant was served via electronic means (permission to do so granted by Mr. 
Wangsgard) on the following counsel of record: 
Craig Wangsgard, Esq. 
2001 South State St.. # S3600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190-1200 
And the Original filed with: 
Judge William W. Barrett 
Third District Court 
Salt Lake Department 
450 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 




LOHRA L. MILLER (#6420) 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
T.J. TSAKALOS (#3289) 
JEFF TFIORPE (#3256) 
CRAIG WANGSGARD (#6052) 
Deputy District Attorneys 
2001 South State Street, #S3600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190-1200 
Telephone: (801)468-3421 
Facsimile: (801)468-2622 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
Plaintiff, PROVIDE AN INVESTIGATOR AND 
EXPERT WITNESSES AT STATE 
vs. : EXPENSE 
RANDY FETCH JEFFS, 
: Case No. 081903791 
Defendant. Judge William W. Barrett 
Salt Lake County', by and through its attorneys, respectfully submits this Memorandum 
in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Provide an Investigator and Expert Witnesses at State 
Expense on the following grounds: 
1. Under the provisions of the Utah Indigent Defense Act (the "Act"), U.C.A. 77-32-
101 et. seq.. Salt Lake County has contracted with the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
1
 Salt Lake County is the legal entity which has the statutory responsibility to provide for the defense of 
indigent defendants in this case, pursuant to the Utah Indigent Defense Act, U.C.A. 77-32-101, et seq. Salt Lake 
County is represented by the Civil/Litigation Division of the District Attorney's Office, which division is entering its 
appearance for the puiposes of opposing this motion only and not for the prosecution. 
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("LDA") to provide for the legal defense of indigent defendants, including defense resources and 
counsel. Accordingly, under Section 77-32-306(4) of the Act LDA is the "exclusive source'* 
from which indigent legal defense, including indigent defense resources, ma}' be provided in this 
case, unless the Court finds a "'compelling reason" to authorize or designate a noncontracting 
attorney or defense resource for the indigent defendant. 
2. Assuming for the sake of argument that the Defendant is indigent under the 
procedures and standards set forth in Section 77-32-202 of the Act. there is no '"compelling 
reason" which would justify the Court to authorize or designate a non-contracting attorney or 
defense resource for the defense in this case, pursuant to the provisions of Sections 77-32-
302(2)(b) and (c), 77-32-303 and 77-32-306(4). U.C.A. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Amended Information in this case charges the Defendant with Attempted 
Aggravated Murder, a 1st degree felony, (four counts): together with four additional charges, 
including Discharge of Firearm from a Vehicle, Domestic Violence in the Presence of a Child, 
Reckless Endangerment, and Interference with Arresting Officer. [Court Record] 
2. On May 20, 2008, at the Defendant's initial appearance, the Court found the 
Defendant indigent and appointed the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association ('"LDA") to 
represent the Defendant. [Court RecordJ 
3. Subsequently, on July 8. 2008. private counsel, David Drake, filed his 
Appearance of Counsel [Court Record] 
o 
4. On February 9, 2009, private counsel filed a "Motion to Declare Defendant 
Indigent and to Provide an Investigator and Expert Witnesses] at State Expense." The Motion 
asks the Court to appoint: (1) an investigator to conduct interviews of "various police officers" 
and to perform "other investigatory tasks"; (2) a ballistic expert "due to the paths of the bullets 
allegedly fired by defendant and the fact that defendant has been charged with intentionally 
attempting to kill various police officers"; and (3) a medical expert to testify concerning the 
allegation that "defendant inadvertently ingested various quantities of prescription drugs and 
alcohol which, in the opinion of defendant substantially altered his mental state to the point that 
he has no recollection of the events leading to his arrest." [Defendant's Motion] 
5. Defendant's Motion contains no legal authority for the request and is not 
accompanied by any memorandum containing any such legal authority. [Defendant's Motion] 
6. Salt Lake County, pursuant to its statutory responsibility to provide for the legal 
defense of indigents, including defense resources and counsel has contracted with the Salt Lake 
Legal Defender Association ("LDA"). Under the terms of the Agreement for Services 
("Agreement5'), the LDA has the responsibility to contract with investigators, medical 
professionals and other expert resources necessary for a complete defense as set forth in Section 
77-32-301, U.C.A. The LDA is a well qualified firm that has provided quality legal defense 




THE LDA IS THE "EXCLUSIVE SOURCE" FROM WHICH THE 
INDIGENT LEGAL DEFENSE, INCLUDING DEFENSE RESOURCES, 
MAY BE PROVIDED IN THIS CASE. UNLESS THE COURT, AFTER 
NOTICE AND HEARING, FINDS A "COMPELLING REASON" FOR THE 
APPOINTMENT OF A NONCONTRACTING ATTORNEY OR DEFENSE 
RESOURCE. 
The provisions of the Utah Indigent Defense Act govern not only the procedures and 
standards for the determination of the indigence of a criminal defendant, but also the procedures 
and standards for the Court to appoint counsel and provide for indigent defense resources. 
Section 77-32-302(2)(b) of the Act establishes the following rule: 
"If the county or municipality responsible to provide for the legal defense of an indigent, 
including defense resources and counsel, has arranged by contract to provide those services 
through a legal aid association, and the court has received notice or a copy of the contract, the 
court shall assign the legal aid association named in the contract to defend the indigent and 
provide defense resources." (Emphasis added). 
Although this appointment to defend and "provide defense resources" appears to be 
mandatory, there is a limited exception to the rule set forth in Section 77-32-302(2)(e): 
"If the court considers the assignment of a noncontracting attorney or defense resource to 
provide legal services to an indigent defendant despite the existence of an indigent legal services 
contract and the court has a copy or notice of the contract, before the court may make the 
assignment, it shall: 
(i) set the matter for a hearing; 
(ii) give proper notice of the hearing to the attorney of the responsible county or 
municipality; and 
(Hi) make findings that there is a compelling reason to appoint a noncontracting attorney 
or defense resource." (Emphasis added). 
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In this case, Defendant's Motion fails to address this "compelling reason" standard for 
the appointment of the requested noncontracting investigator and expert witnesses. In fact, 
Defendant's Motion ignores the provisions and requirements set forth in the Indigent Defense 
Act. 
Under the provisions of the Act, in establishing the legal standard for the court to appoint 
a noncontracting attorney or defense resource, the Legislature makes specific reference to Rule 
15, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Section 78R-1 -1 51 (expenses for expert witnesses) 
and makes them subject to the "compelling reason'' standard". 
Section 77-32-303 provides: 
"If a county or municipality has contracted for, or otherwise made arrangements for, the 
legal defense of indigents, including a competent attorney and defense resources, the court may 
not appoint a noncontracting attorney or resource either under this part, Section 78B-1-151, or 
Rule 15, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, unless the court: 
(1) conducts a hearing with proper notice to the responsible entity to consider the 
authorization or designation of a noncontract attorney or resource; and 
(2) makes a finding that there is a compelling reason to authorize or designate a 
noncontracting attorney or resources for the indigent defendant/' (Emphasis added). 
In enacting the "exclusive source" provision set forth in Section 77-3-2-306(4), the 
Legislature showed, a clear intent to provide counties and municipalities a means to effectively 
manage the costs for providing legal defense and defense resources for indigent defendants 
through contracting with LDA and legal aid associations. 
2
 As a historical note, in State v. Burns, 4 P.3d 795 (Utah 2000), which was decided under the 1992 version 
of the Indigent Defense Act, the Court held that neither the Act nor Rule 15 Utah R. Grim. P. require that an indigent 
defendant be represented by the LDA to qualify lor public assistance for expert witnesses provided there is proof of 
necessity and establishment of indigence. However, the following year after the Burns decision, the Utah Legislature 
amended the Indigent Defense Act in Senate Bill 154 (2001) for the purpose of overturning the Burns decision. 
Under the revised and current version of the Act, a court must find a "compelling reason" prior to authorizing either 
"legal counsel" or a "defense resource" (such as an investigator or expert witness) outside of the LDA contract. 
Specifically, the Act now provides "The indigent's preference for other counsel or defense resources may not be 
considered a compelling reason justifying the appointment of a noncontracting attorney or defense resource." 
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Further, the Act clearly reflects a legislative intent in favor of the ''exclusive source" 
method of contracting when it provides that "The indigent's preference for other counsel or 
defense resources may not be considered a compelling reason j ustifying the appointment of a 
noncontracting attorney or defense resource." (Emphasis added]. Section 77-32-302(2)(f), 
U.C.A. 
II 
THERE IS NO "COMPELLING REASON" WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY 
THE COURT IN GOING OUTSIDE OF THE LDA CONTRACT TO 
AUTHORIZE OR DESIGNATE A NON-CONTRACTING ATTORNEY OR 
DEFENSE RESOURCE FOR THE DEFENSE IN THIS CASE. 
In order for the Court to go outside of the LDA contract to authorize and designate a 
noncontracting defense resource in this case, the defense must provide a ''compelling reason" 
sufficient to allow the Court to make findings on the record. The Defendant's Motion fails to 
address the "compelling reason" standard established in the Act. 
As stated above, the Act provides that the Defendant's preference for other counsel, such 
as Mr. Drake, or other defense resources, such as those requested here, may not be considered a 
"compelling reason"] ustifying a defense resource outside of the contract. 
In addition, the Act also defines "compelling reason" in Section 77-32-201(2) to include 
the following circumstances: 
"(a) a conflict of interest; 
(b) the contracting attorney does not have sufficient expertise to provide an effective 
defense of the indigent; or 
(c) the defense resource is insufficient or lacks expertise to provide a complete defense/' 
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A. CONFLICT OF INTEREST. In applying these circumstances to the present case, 
there is no allegation that the LDA has a conflict of interest. It should be noted also that the LDA 
Agreement provides for conflict cases, so thai it is the responsibility of the LDA to hire and pay 
for conflict counsel and defense resources in conflict cases where the LDA has a conflict of 
interest which would prevent the LDA from representing an indigent defendant in a case. 
Accordingly, a conflict of interest is not a "compelling reason" in this case which would justify 
going outside of the contract. 
B. LACK OF SUFFICIENT EXPERTISE. With regard to the second circumstance 
relating to insufficient expertise of the contracting attorney, this would not apply to this case 
because the Defendant has retained his own private counsel. In addition, there is no evidence or 
allegation that LDA attorneys do not have sufficient expertise to provide an effective defense in 
this case. 
C. SUFFICIENCY OF DEFENSE RESOURCE. With regard to the third circumstance 
relating to the sufficiency of the defense resource or the lack of expertise to provide a complete 
defense, there should be little question that the LDA is well qualified to provide quality legal 
defense resources to indigent defendants and has the resources and expertise to contract with 
qualified investigators, medical professionals and other expert witnesses and resources necessary 
for a complete defense. 
Because the County has already paid the LDA under the existing Agreement to provide 
all required legal services and resources for all indigent defendants in Salt Lake County, any 
order requiring payment for services and resources outside of the contract, as requested by the 
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Defendant, would result in the County having to pay twice for the defense resources in this case, 
i.e. a double payment. 
The Defendant's preference in this case for other counsel (Mr. Drake) or other defense 
resources (the requested "investigator", "ballistic expert", and "medical expert") outside of the 
LDA contract cannot legally be considered a "compelling reason" justifying the appointment of 
the Defendant's desired defense resources at County expense (Section 77-32~302(2)(f), U.C.A.). 
CONCLUSION 
The provisions of the Utah Indigent Defense Act govern not only the procedures and 
standards for the determination of the indigence of a criminal defendant, but also the procedures 
and standards for the Court to appoint counsel and provide for indigent defense resources. 
Salt Lake County has contracted with the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association to 
provide for the legal defense of indigent defendants, including defense resources and counsel. 
Accordingly, under Section 77-32-306(4) of the Act, LDA is the "exclusive source" from which 
indigent legal defense, including indigent defense resources, may be provided in this case, unless 
the court finds a "compelling reason" to authorize or designate a noncontracting attorney or 
defense resource for the indigent defendant. In the absence of such evidentiary showing and 
resulting finding of a. "compelling reason" by the Court, the County is not authorized to use 
taxpayer funds for such purpose and any payment by the County for such purpose would be 
unlawful. 
Under the procedures and standards set forth in the Act, there is no "compelling reason" 
which would justify the Court to authorize or designate a non-contracting attorney or defense 
8 
resource for the defense in this case, The Act specifically provides that an indigent defendant's 
preference for other counsel such as Mr. Drake, or other defense resources, such as the specific 
investigator and expert witnesses requested here, may not be considered a "compelling reason" 
justifying the appointment of a noncontracting attorney or defense resource. 
The LI) A is well qualified to provide indigent legal defense, including defense resources, 
to indigent defendants and has the resources and expertise to contract with qualified 
investigators, medical professionals and other expert resources necessary for a complete defense. 
For the reasons set forth above. Salt Lake County respectfully requests that Defendant's 
Motion be denied. 
DATED this /$//) day of February, 2009. 
LOHRA L. MILLER 
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David Drake, P.C. 
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Miehaela Andruzzi 
Deputy District Attorney 
District Attorney's Office 
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Patrick L. Anderson 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
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County Contract # ^ ( ^ O M O I Z J C 
District Attorney #2004-1644 
AGREEMENT FOR SERVICES 
THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into this day o f \jAAj£^xA^Wi 
2004, by and between SALT LAICE COUNTY, a body corporate and politic of the state of Utah, 
hereinafter referred to as "COUNTY", and SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, 
a non-profit corporation of the state of Utah, hereinafter referred to as "LEGAL DEFENDERS". 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
WHEREAS, the Legislature of the state of Utah in 1981 enacted Title 77, Chapter 32, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, entitled "Indigent Defense Act," which Act sets 
minimum standards for the defense of persons charged with crimes who face the possibility of 
deprivation of liberty within the state, who are legally indigent and financially unable to obtain 
an adequate defense thereof; and 
WHEREAS, Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-306, (1953 as amended), allows COUNTY to 
provide the legal services prescribed by the Act through non-profit legal aid associations; and 
WHEREAS, SALT LAKE COUNTY Ordinance Section 2.76.010 et seq. provides that 
COUNTY shall discharge its obligation to provide legal counsel and investigators and defense 
support services to indigent defendants by contracting yearly with SALT LAKE LEGAL 
DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION. 
WHEREAS, LEGAL DEFENDERS has been established and is able to provide legal 
representation for indigent defendants as provided by law. 
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
1 
1. CONSIDERATION 
A. COUNTY does hereby engage LEGAL DEFENDERS to perform the services 
recited and set forth herein and to pay to LEGAL DEFENDERS for said services the sum of 
$7,461,195.00 for the period of January 1, 2005 through December 31, 2005. The money shall be 
made available in two payments according to terms and conditions of this agreement as follows; 
53,730,597.50 to be advanced on or before January 15, 2005; and 
S3,730?592,50 to be advanced on or before July 1, 2005. 
B. It is understood and agreed that the maximum total cost of this agreement, 
excluding the provisions of paragraphs 2B in regard to habeas corpus, and 4 and 5 below, shall 
not exceed .$7,461,195.00. Said total cost shall be inclusive of all professional fees and expenses 
that may be incurred by LEGAL DEFENDERS- Costs for transcripts and reporter services on 
appeal or in other cases shall be borne by LEGAL DEFENDERS at no additional charge to 
COUNTY. 
C. LEGAL DEFENDERS agree to submit a written invoice to COUNTY'S Contract 
Manager at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of the next semi-annual payment date and 
following the receipt of said invoice by COUNTY, said payment may be processed by 
COUNTY. 
2. SERVICES TO BE RENDERED 
A, LEGAL DEFENDERS shall perform the legal services required hereunder in a 
professional and ethical manner under guidelines and standards as set forth in the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, Canons of Judicial Conduct, and other such regulations and statutes as 
shall govern the practice of law in the state of Utah together with such other regulations or 
2 
statutory provisions to which LEGAL DEFENDERS may be subject as a result of federal law. 
B. (1) LEGAL DEFENDERS agree to provide legal advice and representation at 
all stages of the proceedings, to indigent persons entitled thereto as indicated in this agreement 
after appointment by a Judge of the Justice Court of Salt Lake County, the District Court of Salt-
Lake County, or the Court of Appeals, or by a Justice of the Supreme Court of Utah, provided the 
person is charged under the laws of the State of Utah with a felony, misdemeanor, or probation 
violation for any offense committed in Salt Lake County, or is seeking a first right of appeal to 
the District Court, Court of Appeals, or Supreme Court of the State of Utah pursuant to the 
provisions of the Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-301. LEGAL DEFENDERS agree to provide the 
aforementioned service with respect to each and every- indigent person entitled thereto after court 
appointment, except in those cases where, as defined herein, a legal conflict of interest exists 
such as would preclude counsel from rendering his undivided loyalty to the client as provided in 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32*301, et seq. 
(2) LEGAL DEFENDERS further agrees tc provide legal advise and 
representation to. all indigent persons entitled thereto who are seeking a writ of habeas corpus to 
obtain release from the Salt Lake County Jail and, accordingly, LEGAL DEFENDERS need not 
obtain court appointment prior to or as a condition of providing such legal advice and services 
notwithstanding any other provision of this agreement. The parties agree that the consideration 
paid the LEGAL DEFENDERS under paragraph 1 or the amount of the Conflicts Fund under 
paragraph 4 may be increased by such amount as will be reasonably necessary to provide habeas 
corpus services, 
C. LEGAL DEFENDERS agree that there shall be no representation of a person by 
3 
LEGAL DEFENDERS prior to an actual court appointment or otherwise outside the terms of this 
agreement. 
D. LEGAL DEFENDERS agree to submit itemized quarterly reports reflecting: 
(1) New Cases Receiyed_puring Quarter 
a Felony 
b Misdemeanor, State Offenses 
c. City and County Ordinance Misdemeanor 
d. Appeals 
(2) Total Pending Cases - each category above 




(4) Full-time equivalent attorneys working during the quarter assigned to felony, 
misdemeanor, city ordinances and appeals. 
(5) Number of conflict-of-interest cases referred during the quarter and reason for the 
referral. 
(6) Actual court appointments of LEGAL DEFENDERS made during the quarter, 
listing the date and time of each appointment. 
E. LEGAL DEFENDERS agree, upon reasonable notice, to allow COUNTY access 
to books and records for the purpose of auditing LEGAL DEFENDERS7 use of public funds, 
This dots not apply to confidential clknl files. 
3. CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
4 
A A conflict-of-interest, such as would allou LEGAL DEFENDERS to withdraw 
pursuant to this agreement, must be of such a nature as to be proscribed by case law, statute, or 
the Rules of Professional Conduct It is agreed by the parties that a conflict-of-interest does not 
include withdrawals occasioned by aeiendant's request for counsel of his choice oi disagreements 
with or dislikes of appointed counsel It is further agreed that any withdrawals from clients for 
other than an actual legal confiict-of-mterest will require LEGAL DEFENDERS to pay for 
additionally-appointed counsel from the sum of money provided by COUNTY in paragraph 4 
B. LEGAL DEFENDERS further agree that if, m their opinion, such a conflict exists, 
the facts and circumstances so far as practicable, without disclosing confidences, will be 
presented, after notice has been given to the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office and to 
the appropriate judge who has jurisdiction over the case for determination as to whether such a 
conflict, in fact, exists If such court concludes that there is, m fact, a conflict-of-interest, 
LEGAL DEFENDERS will be relieved of the responsibility of providing legal advice and 
representation for such defendant, except as otherwise provided for in this agreement. 
4. CONFLICTS FUND 
COUNTY also agrees to pay LEGAL DEFENDERS the sum of 5458,700.00 for payment 
of costs and representation of defendants when non-LEGAL DEFENDERS attorneys are 
appointed to represent defendants in conflict-of-interest cases as defined herein Any amount 
required to be expended above that sum for conflict-of-interest cases shall be paid from the sum 
provided LEGAL DEFENDERS in paragraph 1. LEGAL DEFENDERS shall pay for conflict-
of-interest counsel only after a court order allowing withdrawal of LEGAL DEFENDERS and 
appointment of conflict counsel. Payments shall be made to appointed counsel or counsel 
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retained on a contract to do conflict-of-interest cases pursuant to that contract. Appointment of 
counsel for conflict-of-interest on capital murder cases is excluded from this agreement to the 
extent that the above budget figure is exceeded. Any amount remaining in the conflict-of-interest 
account to be maintained by LEGAL DEFENDERS, after the payment of all legal fees and 
associated costs resulting from the appointment of conflicts counsel incurred during the calendar 
year, shall become the sole and exclusive property of LEGAL DEFENDERS. The sum shall be 
paid semi-annually as follows: 
$229,350.00 to be on or before January 15, 2005; and 
$229,350.00 to be advanced on or before July 1 > 2005. 
5. OUT-OF-STATE WITNESSES 
A. COUNTY agrees to reimburse LEGAL DEFENDERS for actual expenses 
incurred by LEGAL DEFENDERS m transporting out-of-state witnesses to the state of Utah to 
attend and testify at a criminal trial where such attendance is obtained in accordance with the 
provisions of the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in 
Criminal Proceedings, Sections 77-21-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated 1.953, as amended. Notice 
shall be submitted to the Salt Lake County District Attorney advising of the time and place of the 
court hearings for approval of the need for the witness and expenses associated with securing the 
attendance of the witness, sufficient to provide COUNTY the opportunity to oppose the 
requested witness or expenses as appropriate. No funds shall be transmitted until after reasonable 
documentation has been submitted and approved by the Salt Lake County Auditor, such 
documentation to include a copy of the court, order or certificate approving the med for the 
witness and a copy of the court's approval of the expenses. 
B. COUNTY agrees to provide $15,000.00 to cover expenses incurred in 
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transporting out-of-state witnesses or for other extraordinary expenses. The Contract Manager is 
empowered to approve expenses exceeding $15,000.00 for good cause shown, subject to 
appropriate adjustments to the budget allocation by Salt Lake County. Application for 
reimbursements from this amount shall be as provided in paragraph 5.A. for out-of-state 
witnesses or with such documentation as COUNTY may request for other extraordinary 
expenses. 
6. AFFIDAVIT OF INDIGENCY 
LEGAL DEFENDERS shall cooperate with the courts to obtain an affidavit from the 
individual defendant averring his/her inability to pay for private counsel. The affidavit shall 
comply with the requirements of Utah Code .Ann. § 77-32-202 (1953, as amended). LEGAL 
DEFENDERS agree that they shall not act in a case until the court has issued its order of 
appointment. LEGAL DEFENDERS further agree to provide infonnation to the court and the 
Criminal Justice Services Division of Salt Lake County concerning any changes with regard to 
the indigency status of a defendant which changes would affect the qualifying of the defendant 
for court-appointed counsel LEGAL DEFENDERS also agree to assist the courts and the Salt 
Lake County District Attorney's Office in providing information necessary7 to recover costs 
pursuant to Utah Code Amu § 77-32-202(6), including maintaimng individual case records which 
reflect costs and types of services as ordered by the court. 
7. CONTRACT MANAGER 
It is agreed that the responsible party representing COUNTY in the administration and 
management of this agreement shall be the Chief Administrative Officer or designee, herein 
referred to as "Contract Manager". 
8. SALARY SCALE 
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LEGAL DEFENDERS agree to maintain a salary scale, insofar as possible, comparable 
to salaries of state or COUNTY legal officers m Salt Lake COUNTY with such increases as may 
be required, subject to the restriction that lawyers of LEGAL DEFENDERS will not engage in 
private practice and shall not represent clients m any civil action against COUNTY or participate 
in or receive any financial remuneration from any source as a result of any civil action against 
COUNTY. 
9. LEGAL DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION BUDGET 
LEGAL DEFENDERS shall prepare a budget and apply the funds received from the 
COUNTY toward payment of the operating costs (salaries and. overhead), on a pro rata basis, 
which are incurred during the 365-day period as is SQ{ forth in LEGAL DEFENDERS' BUDGET, 
which shall be formally approved by the COUNTY for fiscal year 2005 and yearly thereafter. 
10. TERM OF CONTRACT 
The parties agree that the term hereof shall extend for the period set out m paragraph 1, 
but that said term is automatically extended yearly unless terminated as provided in Section 1.2 
below. For each yearly extension LEGAL DEFENDERS shall submit yearly budgets as provided 
herein. The COUNTY'S annual appropriation shall be determined yearly at the time the 
COUNTY adopts its budget. 
H. RESOURCE COMMITMENT 
LEGAL DEFENDERS agree that, for the period of this agreement, it will dedicate 
attorney resources at least equivalent to that set forth in its yearly LEGAL DEFENDER'S 
BUDGET, approved by COUNTY. LEGAL DEFENDERS, during the contract period, shall 
retain the numbers of attorneys and other staff as indicated in that BUDGET. LEGAL 
DEFENDERS will not use COUNTY funds to finance or support legal defense services for any 
8 
other governmental entities 
12 TERMINATION 
The parties agree that either party shall have the right at any time after the effective date 
of this contract to terminate this agreement by giving Hie other party six (6) months notice m 
writing by registered mail return receipt requested, specifying the reason or reasons therefor If 
notice is so given, tins agreement shall terminate upon the expiration of the six (6) months and 
the liability of the parties hereunder for the further performance of the terms of this agreement 
shall thereupon cease, but neither party shall be relieved of the duty to perforin their obligations 
up to the date of termination. In the event of termination, the number of calendar days from and 
including January 1 to the date of termination shall ue computed and prorated into the total 
contract amount. Any funds previously advanced by COUNTY in excess of the amount 
computed by the above formula shall be returned to COUNTY within 60 days of the date of 
termination. 
13, NON-FUNDING CLAUSE 
It is understood and agreed by the parties hereto that funds are not presently available for 
performance of this agreement by COUNTY. COUNTY'S obligation for performance of this 
agreement is contingent upon funds being appropriated for payments due under this agreement. 
In the event no funds or insufficient funds are appropriated and budgeted in any fiscal year by 
COUNTY for payments due under this agreement, for the current or any succeeding fiscal year, 
this agreement shall create no obligation on COUNTY as to such current or succeeding fiscal 
years and shall terminate and become null and void on the last day of the fiscal year for which 
funds were budgeted and appropriated, or, in the event of a reduction in appropriations, on the 
last day before the reduction becomes effective, except as to those portions or payments herein 
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then agreed upon for which funds shall have been appropriated and budgeted. Said termination 
shall not be construed as a breach of or default under this agreement and said termination shall be 
without penalty, additional payments, or other expense to COUNTY of any kind whatsoever, and 
no right of action for damages or other relief shall accrue to the benefit of LEGAL 
DEFENDERS, its successors or assigns, as to this agreement, or any portion thereof, which may 
so terminate and become null and void. 
14. ASSIGNMENT 
LEGAL DEFENDERS may not assign or transfer its performance of the agreement, any 
interest therein, or claim thereunder without the prior wntten approval of COUNTY. 
15. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR 
LEGAL DEFENDERS agree that it is an independent contractor and that its officers and 
employees shall not be considered employees or officers of COUNTY" nor entitled to any 
employee benefits as COUNTY employees as a result of the execution of the agreement. 
16. INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE 
A, LEGAL DEFENDERS shall indemnify COUNTY", its officers and employees 
against liability for any claim, injur}' or damage caused by any negligent act or omission of any of 
LEGAL DEFENDERS' officers, employees, volunteers or agents in the performance of the 
agreement and shall hold COUNTY harmless from any loss occasioned as a result of the 
performance of the contract by LEGAL DEFENDERS. 
B-, LEGAL DEFENDERS agree to maintain such insurance as will fully protect both 
LEGAL DEFENDERS and COUNTY from any and all claims under the 'Worker's Compensation 
Act, from any and all other claims of whatsoever kind or nature for the damage to property or for 
10 
personal injury, including death, made by anyone whomsoever, that may arise from operations 
carried on under this agreement and from any and all claims of malpractice, including civil 
rights violations under, but not limited to, Section 1983 of the Federal Civil Rights Act. LEGAL 
DEFENDERS agree to provide COUNTY with certificates evidencing the required coverage 
before LEGAL. DEFENDERS begin work hereunder and which are attached as part of this 
agreement. Such insurance shall be provided at LEGAL DEFENDERS' own cost and expense 
and shall name COUNTY as an additional named insured. 
17. NO OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE INTEREST 
No officer or employee of COUNTY shall have any pecuniary interest, direct or indirect, 
in the agreement or the proceeds thereof. No ofncer or employee of LEGAL DEFENDERS nor 
any member of their families shall serve on a COUNTY board or committee or hold any such 
position which either by rule, practice or action nominates, recommends, or supervises LEGAL 
DEFENDERS' operations, or authorized funding to LEGAL DEFENDERS. 
18'. MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT 
No alteration or variation of the terms of the agreement shall be valid unless made in 
writing and signed by the parties thereto. 
19. DEFAULT 
If either party defaults in the performance of the agreement or any of its covenants, terms, 
conditions, or provisions, the defaulting party shall pay ail costs and expenses including a 
reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing the agreement or from 




LEGAL DEFENDERS assure that it will comply with the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA), and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and that no person shall, on the grounds 
of race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, disability, or national origin be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be otherwise subjected to 
discrimination under this agreement. 
21. RECORDS 
LEGAL DEFENDERS shall maintain such records and accounts as may be deemed 
necessary for COUNTY to assure a proper accounting for all funds paid for the perfomiance of 
this agreement. Upon written request, records will be available for audit purposes to COUNTY 
and other authorized entities requiring such records. Records will be maintained by LEGAL 
DEFENDERS for at least three (3) years, or such longer period as may be required by law or 
regulation, after the expiration of this agreement, 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this agreement to be duly executed on 
the day first above written. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By; \u^Ud^\ J AMTUA^ 
I Mayor or jDesignee 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
County of Salt Lake ) . _ ^ 
On this c2tf day of O^^^rT^^ 2004, personally appeared before me 
*s//Mt4&ot* , who being duly sworn, did say that s/he is the 
*4j'- / 4 f ^ / < ^ of Salt Lake County, Office of Mayor, and that the foregoing 
instrument was signed on behalf of Salt Lake County, by authority of law. 
0S&* KAREN R. LOWE ' H (] (biA^/tr.- nJ"** ^Ajhc^^L^^i 
W$m N0T^Y/°Syf; W*? &ffiAV- NOTARY PUBLIC, Residing in Salt Lake 
iS'R^vU!) 2001 South State Street, N2100 » c 
wOtaW// soil lake aty.uiewo County, State of Utah 




SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER 
ASSOCIATION 
Chairman 
Board of Directors 
STATE OF UTAH 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Ont 
before me 
11 , day of NlCLtofaKs 
faiferr MmA 
say that he is the CMkfMas\ Y-
2004, personally appeared 
, who being by me duly sworn, did 
_, of Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association, a 
corporation, and that the foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by 
authority of its Board of Directors, and he acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the 
same. 
™J£F A T H E R STOKES 
WtnWY PUBUC* STATE OP UUM ! 







" " "'" > I W I I . 
NOTARY PUBLIC" 
Residing in Salt Lake Countv, State of Utah 
(SEAL) 
13 
December 20, 2004 
Mayor Alan Dayton SALT LAKE 
C OTINTY 2001 s state st-ste-210D 
^
W
 Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
CELFHRATIM, OUK 3 u b j e c t ; Agreement with Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association to provide legal services to 
SESQUICEITTENNIAL indigent defendants. SG04012C 
] 50 YEARS or SERVICE 
1 8 ^ 2 - 2 0 0 2 P l e a s e a PP r o v e and execute the above referenced agreement between Salt Lake Legai 
Defenders Association artd Salt Lake County to provide legal services for indigent defendants 
and to pay non-Legal O&fender attorneys who are appointed in conflict of interest cases. 
NANCY WORKMAN 
SALT LAKE COUNIY MAYOR 
The fee structure is as follows. 
For iegal services of indigent defendants 
11O-5QO-5000-4540-r4AQ0 
HUMAN SERVICES
 0 n o r b e f o r e j a n u a r y 1 5 i 2Q05 
DEPARTMENT On or before Juiy 1, 2005 
"Making o positioe 
difference" ^ o r confNct of interest fund: 
110-5GO-500CM542-NAOO 
_
 r, On or before January 15, 2005 
KERRY D, STEADMAN





DIRECTOR OF HUMAN SERVICES 
ksteadman@co.slc.in.us
 Jhe ^ |R ^  2QQ5 ^ b e $ 7 ^ 9 Q 9 5 0 Q 
DIVISIONS: Legal Defenders shall prepare a budget yeariy and apply the funds received from the County 
toward operating costs. The term is automatically extended yeariy unless terminated as 
AGING SERVICES p rov jdec j | n ^ e contract. The annual contract amount shall be that amount approved adopted 
ANIMAL SERVICES i n tn t? b u d 9 e t b > ' t h e C o u n *y Council. 
COMMUNITY RESOURCES This is a non-encumbered contract with funds available in the above referenced account 
AND DEVELOPMENT numbers. 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICE^^^^ 
'*-£^-L-<?&t-
LIBRARY SERVICES
 D a v e B r e n n a 
MENTAL HBAIW SERVICES Mayor Operations 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVICES 
YOUTH SERVICES 
K g j ^ i e a d m a n , Director 











Mayor Alan DWtojC 
•Wl/fAj 




PETER M. CORROON 
Sail Lake County Mayor 
2001 South State Street 
Suite N2100 
Salt Lake City, UT 8419CM020 
801 / 468-2500 
801 / 468-3535 lax 
January 3, 2006 
Mayor Peter Corroon 
Salt Lake County 
2001 S State Street, Ste. 2100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
RE: Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association Agreement for services to 
be rendered in 2006 Contract SG04012C. 
Submitted for you approval is the above referenced funding request. 
The Salt Lake County Council has approved funding for indigent legal 
criminal representation with the adoption of the final budget for 2006 in 
their meeting on December 6, 2005. Please direct Contracts and 
Procurement to add the following non-encumbered amounts to the 
corresponding commodities in this contract. 
Commodity line .2: 
indigent Legal 
Commodity line 2; 
Indigent Legal Conflict 11Q-500-4542-2930-NA00 S 458,700.00 
110-50Q-4540-2930-NA00 $ 7,921,652.00 
Respectfully, 
£^5b£~: 
fean Ni^teoh, Director 
Human Services Department 
T^mmy Stew&fC Fiscal Administrator 
Human Service Department 
'C/aig, 
:s Manager 
^^Ron Garner or designee, 
d\ Auditor Review 
.PUAJJUU-^ 
Mayor Peter Corroon or designee 
if-b/H, 




PETER M. CORROON 
Salt Lake County Mayor 
HlilMAN SERVICES 
DEPARTMENT 
"Making a positive difference" 
Jean Nielsen 
Director Human Services 
Kelly Colopy 





CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES 
SALT LAKE VALLEY 
HEALTH DEPARTMENT 
LIBRARY SERVICES 
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVICES 
YOUTH SERVICES 
Salt Lake County 
Government Center 
2001 South State Street 
Suite N-4300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190-2000 
801/468-2184 
Fax 801/468-2196 
December 18, 2006 
Mayor Peter Corroon 
Sait Lake County 
2001 S. State Street, Ste 21 00 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
RE: Salt Lake LegaJ Defenders Association Agreement for services 
to be rendered in 2007 Contract SG040I2C 
Submitted for you approval is the above reverenced funding request. 
The Sait Lake County Council has approved funding for indigent legal 
criminal representation with the adoption of the final budget for 
2007. PSease direct Contracts and Procurement to add the following 
non-encumbered amounts to the corresponding commodities in this 
contract 
Commodity line 4: 
Indigent Legal 
Commodity line 4: 
indigent Legai Conflict 
Respectfully, 
110-200-2900-4540-SfWtQI $8,396,380. 
11 0-200-2900-4542-SM01 $ 533,449.00 
in Nielsen, Director 
Human Services Department 
Tammy Stewart, Fiscal Adm. 
Human Services Departrneat 
Li?l^ 







PETER M. CORROON 
Salt Lake County Mayor 
HUMAN ^ SERVICES 
iifiPARTMENT 
"Making a positive difference" 
Jean Nielsen 
Director Human Services 
Kelly Coiopy 





;RIM!NAL JUSTICE SERVICES 
SALT LAKE VALLEY 
HEALTH DEPARTMENT 
LIBRARY SERVICES 
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 
JBSTANCE ABUSE SERVICES 
YOUTH SERVICES 
Sail Lake County 
Government Center 
2001 South State Street 
Suite N-4300 
Sal! Lake City, UT 84190-2000 
801 / 468-2164 
Fax 801/468-2196 
December 17, 2007 
Mayor Peter Corroon 
Salt Lake County 
2001 S State Street, Suite 2100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
SUBJECT: Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association Agreement for services to be 
rendered in 2008, Contract SG04012C07 
Submitted for your approval is the above referenced funding request, The Salt Lake 
County Council has approved funding for mdigent legal criminal representation with 
tlie adoption of the final budget for 2008. Please direct Contracts and Procurement to 
add the following non-encumbered amounts to the corresponding commodities in this 
contract. For questions, contact Tammy Stewart at 468-2281. 
Commodity Line 6: 
Indigent Legal 
Commodity Line 7: 





- [ > 
Tammy Stewart, Fiscal Administrator 
Department of Human Services 
Jean Nielsen, Director 
Department of Human Services 
*eyj / ; 
Don Gra 
Contracts istrator 
Ion Gaifer W designee, 
Auditor's review 




Page 1 of 
Joe Bryant 
From; Tammy Stewart 
Sent: Tuesday, December 09, 2008 11 ;49 AM 
To: Joe Bryant 
Subject: Funding for Contract SG04012C (Legal Defender Association) 
Hi Joe -
For 2009, the County Council has approved a budget of $11,011,455 for indigent legal criminal representation 
provided by the Sait Lake Legal Defender Association (LDA). These services are provided under contract 
SG04012C. 
Because the LDA's budget has two components, the regular operating budget which is $10,383,006 and the 
conflict counsel budget v/hich \s $628:449, in the past these amounts have been put in two separate commodity 
lines with new commodity lines being used each year. For 2008, Commodity Line 6 was used for the operating 
budget and Commodity Lines 7 was used for the conflict counsel budget. I don't know if you n&eti to create new 
commodity lines for 2009 ~ for me, it serves no purpose to have new iines - or if we really need to split the 
contract amount between two commodity lines. However, I'll work with whatever configuration of commodity iines 
you believe is most appropriate. 
Thank you, 
Ctammy Stewart 
Human Services Fiscal Administrator 






LOHRA L. MILLER (#6420) 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
T.J. TSAKALOS (#3289) 
JEFF THORPE (#3256) 
CRAIG WANGSGARD (#6052) 
Deputy District Attorneys 
2001 South State Street,' #S3600 




IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RANDY FETCH JEFFS. 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER REGARDING 
DEFENDANT'S INDIGENT DEFNSE 
EXPENSES 
Case No. 081903791 
Judge William W7. Barrett 
A hearing was held before the Honorable Judge William W. Barrett on July 13, 2008, at 
the hour of 1:30 P.M.. Said hearing was on Defendant's MOTION TO DECLARE 
DEFENDANT INDIGENT AND TO PROVIDE AN INVESTIGATOR AND EXPERT 
WITNESS AT STATE EXPENSE. Deputy District Attorney Craig Wangsgard represented Salt 
Lake County. David Drake represented defendant Randy Jeffs. Based on testimony of Randy 
Jeffs, review of the pleadings and other good cause appearing, this Court finds as follows: 
oo n 
FINDINGS: 
1. Randy Jeffs and his spouse have two children, their house is currently in foreclosure 
and Mr. and Mrs. Jeffs have filed for bankruptcy protection. 
2. Mr. Jeffs has been incarcerated for the last 14 months and his wife is currently 
unemployed. 
3. Although Mr. Jeffs has paid Mr. Drake $28,000 to represent Mr. Jefts in this matter, 
the family has no other significant income or assets. 
4. Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association ("LDA") is available to represent Mr. Jeffs 
has no conflict of interest in this matter. 
5. LDA has the needed expertise and defense resources to provide an effective defense 
of Mr. Jeffs. 
6. Although LDA was previously appointed to represent Mr. Jeffs, Mr. Jeffs chose to 
hire Mr. Morrison and Mr. Drake as his private counsel, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. Randy Jeffs is indigent within the meaning of Utah code Ann., Sec. 77-32-202(3).. 
2. There is no "compelling reason," as required by Utah Code Ann. Sec. 77-32-




It is ordered that Mr. Jeffs is hereby declared indigent, but the remainder of 
Defendant's Motion to Declare Defendant Indigent and to Provide and Investigator 
and Expert Witness at State Expense is denied. 
Salt Lake County shall have no duty or obligation to pay for an Investigator or Expert 
Witness for Mr. Jeffs. 
DATED this jzti day of 
HONORABI3E W W ^ ^ > B A 1 | I I E T T 
Third District l!oarf?3-$l|.e^v°^ ,1 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
David Drake 
Attorney for Defendant Randy Jeffs 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY thai on the i ^ d a y of July, 2009, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER to be delivered via facsimile transmission and United States first 
class mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
David Drake 
David Drake, P.C. 
6905 South 1300 East, #248 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Facsimile No. (801 )601 -1502 
M ichaela Andruzzi 
Deputy District Attorney 
District Attorney's Office 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Facsimile No. (801)531-41 
Patrick L. Anderson 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
424 East 500 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 111 
Facsimile No. (801)532-0330 
By. %/^y^\, \fL^-
